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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Tobias Albert Ten Eyck for the 
Master of Science in Sociology presented August 12, 1994. 
Title: A Cross-national Study of Attitudes and Group 
Labeling: Multinational corporation (MNC) workers in 
Canada, Brazil, and West Germany. 
Many studies concerning multinational corporations 
{MNCs) are replete with theoretical models and case studies 
that treat MNCs as stand-alone entities. Very little time 
and effort is given to understanding the context in which 
MNCs operate. This context includes not only the fact that 
MNCs transcend national boundaries (political as well as 
geographical), but also the meaning of work and being part 
of a multinational work force for those employed within 
MNCs. This thesis is an effort to elucidate how the 
political/societal/cultural contexts of different host 
countries affect the attitudes of those workers most 
directly involved with foreign-owned MNCs. By shifting the 
focus from the MNC to the political/societal/cultural 
environment of host countries, foreign-owned MNCs can be 
compared across national boundaries (foreign-owned MNC 
workers from three different countries are compared in this 
2 
thesis -- Canada, Brazil, and West Germany). Finally, by 
grounding the workers' attitudes within social identity 
theory, divergent attitudes between the workers from the 
different countries are not only explained, but expected as 
well. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been said that the world is shrinking and 
growing at the same time (Schermerhorn, 1978). Yet are the 
forces causing this polarization happening with equal 
strength? The world continues to grow (divide) through 
such events as the current conflicts in the republics of 
the former Soviet Union -- the most visible (to the Western 
World) being the armed conflict in and around Bosnia. 
There are other conflicts, such as those in Northern 
Ireland and Israel. Fighting has also erupted in Africa, 
though South Africa may be heading for peace. Cuba 
continues to be shut off from the U.S. (and much of the 
rest of the world), and the U.S. is forcing trade embargoes 
on Haiti and threatening them against Canada, Japan, and 
North Korea. 
The world is also continuing to shrink as technology 
in the communication and transportation fields continues to 
grow. Travel to other countries is becoming cheaper and 
quicker, not only for national diplomats, but for the 
average citizen as well (though in many countries the price 
of long distance travel is still well out of reach for much 
of the population). Transoceanic business meetings are 
commonplace among large corporations, and faxes and modems 
are part of most offices. 
The balance between these two forces, though, seems to 
be skewed to the former, at least as far as media coverage 
is concerned. National and ethnic conflicts make front 
page news, while technological innovations and 
transnational transactions are relegated to the back pages. 
Can the latter become more powerful than the former, or at 
least balanced? Do people really want to be part of a 
global community, or do they they have too much invested in 
national pride? By studying workers within foreign-owned 
multinational corporations (MNCs), I will not only try to 
make inroads into understanding these questions, but also 
look to gain a better understanding of group processes. 
For the latter endeavor, I will forsake the mainstream 
macro- and microsociological paradigms for a somewhat newer 
one: Social identity. The use of this theory constitutes 
a secondary purpose for this study. 
Studying workers' (or any human group's) attitudes is 
not an easy task. Theoretical work in this area is too 
aseptic to be used alone, while problems with direct 
observation (Hawthorne effect), and interviews and 
questionnaires (tendencies to give [perceived] socially 
correct answers) make empirical evidence tenuous, and 
findings must be used with caution. In addition, when 
studying the effects of specific institutions (in this case 
MNCs) on the attitudes of individuals, one should take into 
account other institutions that play a part in the observed 
2 
attitudes. To overcome these shortfalls, I will combine 
existing empirical data on workers within foreign-owned 
MNCs with media accounts of national affairs and events in 
three different countries -- Canada, Brazil, and West 
Germany. This should alleviate some of the parsimony of 
studying attitudes and institutions separately, which in 
turn should give me a better insight into the formation of 




REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Many studies concerning groups and group processes 
have their roots in the university laboratory. Many 
college students have been assigned to groups through 
random selection, given some kind of task, and then had 
their response(s) recorded by some social science graduate 
student. These groups then dissipate with (usually) little 
or no contact between members after the experiment. These 
studies are then used to explain group processes outside 
the university (Paulus and Nagar in Hendrick (ed.), 1987). 
In other cases, "real world" small groups and small group 
processes are studied, and these findings are used to 
explain large group processes (~ see Bodenhausen, 
Gaelick, and Wyer's intriguing explanation of nationalism 
based on relationships between heterosexual couples, in 
Hendrick, 1987). Though these studies have been done with 
real people, and have been useful to some extent, the study 
of groups must be expanded beyond the walls of the 
university and small groups. 1 Large group processes (such 
1This is not to say that there are no studies 
exclusively concerned with large groups, for there are many 
of these. For example, many authors have written about 
social movements (~civil rights). Many social 
movements, though, when compared to something such as 
as religious affiliation, team fans, nationalism) need to 
be studied as phenomena beyond the small group, and 
analyzed to further the understanding of how we label 
ourselves, and under what circumstances are some group 
labels more salient than others. 
There are many groups that could be studied, such as 
church groups, military groups, social clubs, or athletic 
teams. I have decided to study work groups, 2 since work is 
so important to a person's self identification (Argyle, 
1989). Another important aspect of a person's self 
identification is nationality. As a matter of fact, 
nationalism has been a major cause of war in the past few 
centuries (Seabury and Codevilla, 1989). To study the 
salience of cosmopolitan worker vs. nationalistic worker, I 
will investigate three multinational corporation (MNC) work 
groups: Ford Canada workers; Brazilian workers in two 
u.s.-owned paper/pulp mills operating in Brazil; and, West 
German managers employed in MNCs. Before I begin to 
compare and contrast these three groups, a review of three 
nationalism are small in scale. Most writers who have 
written on the subject of nationalism look only at the 
ends, and not the means. In other words, they write on the 
relationship between nations and the power this label has 
over the people living within the national borders. There 
are two things wrong with this. First of all, nations, per 
se, do not have relationships -- re~resentatives of the 
nations do. Second, how does a national label attract so 
many people? I hope to suggest answers to these questions 
within the body of the text. 
2r use the term "work groups" to refer not only to 
fellow workers, but also other workers employed by the same 
company or type of work operating in different countries. 
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areas of research is in order. The areas are group 
labeling/social identity theory (with an emphasis on 
nationalism as a type of group label), the importance of 
work, and the impact of MNCs on home and host countries. 
Group Labeling/Social Identity Theory 
In-group/out-group distinctions can be found in the 
work of many social scientists. Though this topic began 
long before the work of Kant, it is interesting to note 
that Kant was one of the first social scientists to present 
the idea that humans have a natural tendency (need) to 
categorize things (Walsh, 1975). He did not write about 
human groups per se, but his ideas can easily be translated 
into the many human group categories that can be found 
today (~ ethnicity, sex, age, religion, nationalism) 
which we use to categorize ourselves and others. 
Turning to the classical thinkers in sociology, group 
differentiation is very salient. For the early conflict 
theorists, such as Marx and Engels, and Weber, the focus 
was on group antagonisms (Freeman vs. Slave, Bourgeoisie 
vs. Proletariat, political groups or politisher Verband, 
and so on); for early functional theorists, such as Comte 
and Simmel, the focus was on the needs fulfilled by 
different groups (Aron, 1967; Collins, 1986; Hogg and 
Abrams, 1988; Marx and Engles, (1848] 1972; Thompson and 
Tunstall, 1971). The idea or notion of different groups 
can be found in most sociological work, though it is not 
always the focal point. The works of Goffman, Parsons, 
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Homans, Dahrendorf, Mills, Habermas, and many other 
sociologists are replete with groups and group affiliation 
and differentiation. Groups are based on family (~ 
Simmel, [1922] 1955), the means of production (Marx and 
Engles, [1848] 1972), ethnicity (~Rex and Mason, 1986; 
van den Berghe, 1981), sex(~ Morris, 1967), religion 
(~Durkheim, 1971). Groups are also differentiated by 
nationality. It is this last categorization that is 
examined here. 
To some writers, nationalism is not an issue. For 
example, in his typology of groups, Simmel lists (in order 
of importance to the individual) family, work, and social 
class as the three most important "groups" ([1922] 1955). 
From an everyday, inductive standpoint, this type of 
reasoning makes sense. For example, suppose your name is 
John Smith, you are an auto mechanic, and consider yourself 
to be part of the U.S. working class. Within national 
(U.S.) boundaries, the former two 'labels' (name and work) 
would give you an idea of self and where you thought you 
stood in U.S. society. The latter label (U.S. citizen) 
would be taken for granted since it would be a common label 
for most people with whom you interact on an every day 
basis. Now, let us suppose that you are traveling in a 
foreign land and meet another John Smith, who is also an 
auto mechanic and considers himself to be part of his 
country's working class. How do you distinguish yourself 
from this other John Smith? Most likely by place of birth, 
i.e. nationality. In other words, nationality can be a 
7 
very salient label under certain circumstances, 3 and may 
even become a master label in times of international 
conflict. 
Unfortunately for Simmel, then, nationalism is a 
powerful group marker. To Weber, " ... nationalism is simply 
[political] legitimacy carried to fervid levels" (Collins, 
1968, pg. 155); or another definition: 
Nationalism ... involves loyalty to a politically 
distinct entity, membership in an elaborately 
organised and relatively populous social grouping, 
adherence to a formalised ideology, and performance or 
relatively stereotyped allegiance-expressing behavior 
(Meyer, 1985; pg. 8). 
In other words, people will fight over national identity 
and threats to it. Fighting does not always have to be 
violent, though it often is. As noted above, Seabury and 
Codevilla (1989) point out that "[n]ationalism is the most 
widespread excuse for war in our time" (pg. 220). Pfaff 
(1993) calls it "the most powerful political force in the 
Twentieth Century" (pg. 13). 
Why is nationalism so important to so many people? 
Before addressing this question, it is important to look at 
some theoretical perspectives that cover group formation 
and labeling. I will examine three such perspectives --
sociobiology, exchange theory, and social identity theory. 
In its simplest form, sociobiology explains social 
phenomenon through natural selection (Reynolds, Falger and, 
3
For example, if you were to meet this same person in 
the U.S. 
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Vine, 1985). In human societies, this means that whatever 
humans do is based on inclusive fitness for the individual. 
In other words, human actions and interactions can be 
reduced to what our genes are telling us to do. Most 
sociobiologists would say this is a vulgar simplification 
of their theoretical paradigm, and point out that most who 
follow this theoretical slant see genetic make-up as only 
part of human behavior. Cultural influences also play a 
major role in actions and interactions (Reynolds, et. al. 
1985). This is not the place to open up the debate on 
sociobiology, but keep in mind, as van den Berghe pointed 
out, " .•. there can be no doubt that biological forces shape 
and constrain patterns of human organizations" (Turner, 
1991, pg. 167). 
Turning to the sociobiological explanation of human 
groups, 
.•. sociobiologists would emphasize that prior 
investments into offspring within a genetic population 
will make common defence against non-members very 
economical and very likely (Meyer, 1985, pg. 82). 
This kind of explanation seems to take as a priori 
just the opposite; ~ non-members would gain by 
destroying this population. 4 This interpretation is 
supported by van der Dennen, who notes that 
4rt is not surprising, given this scenario, that 
sociobiology and game theory are very compatible. The idea 
of a common defense against what is supposedly a common 
aggressor equates to zero-sum games; whatever one group 
loses the other one gains (these gains could be absolute or 
relative). 
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... an individual or a society may be better prepared 
to avoid destruction by aliens as a result of a 
generalised tendency to distrust, avoid, or reject 
foreign-seeming individuals (1985, pg. 8). 
Other sociobiologists, such as Melotti (1985) share 
this same view point. Finally, sociobiologists point out 
that in-group/out-group distinctions are too universal to 
be culturally based, given the variation of cultures around 
the world; this tendency must be genetically based 
(Reynolds, et. al., 1985). 
Homans' exchange theory (as interpreted by Turner, 
19915 ) refutes such functional interpretations of group 
selection. For Homans, the formation of groups is not 
based on genes, but on 
the attainment of rewards and avoidance of punish-
ments. Interaction becomes social behavior whereby 
the mutual actions of individuals have cost and 
reward implications for the parties to the interac-
tion (Turner, 1991., pg. 323). 
Also, groups are usually formed around a leader. This 
leader has more capital resources6 which he/she can use to 
motivate others (through rewards and/or punishments) to 
engage in activities that the leader sees as leading to the 
attainment of more capital resources. The carrying out of 
these activities (whether it is conquering a neighboring 
5Turner differentiates between exchange behaviorism 
and structural exchange theory. The former is derived from 
the work of George c. Homans, while the latter is taken 
from Peter M. Blau. 
61 capital resources' does not necessarily mean money. 
It could be land, food, weapons, etc .. The important thing 
is that one person (or a very small group) has more than 
those around him/her (them). 
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tribe or starting a business) leads to social organization. 
If the group is successful (either by increased rewards or 
avoiding punishments) it may become more efficient and 
further elaborate its patterns of organization. An 
important element of this theory is that it is grounded in 
social structures (networks), and so relations can be 
studied outside of bloodlines. 
The third perspective is social identity theory. 
Social identity theory approaches group formation through 
investments in "positively valued distinctiveness from 
other groups to provide their members with a positive 
social identity" (Hogg and Abrams, 1988, pg. X). Unlike 
sociobiology, where genes are major determinants in human 
action and interaction creating a deterministic shading to 
the paradigm, social identity sees social categories as 
constantly in a state of flux due to economics and history. 
This does not mean that people easily redefine group 
boundaries. Since people use group membership as a source 
for positive identification (self-esteem), they will not 
readily reject current in-groups for possible future out-
groups; there is too much at stake. Not only is positive 
self-identification at stake, but so is a person's (or 
group's) notion of order: 
The theory of social identity rests on an assumption 
that categorization is the process by which people 
order, and render predictable, information about the 
world in which they live. This process of 
categorization operates on objects, other people, and 
oneself, and consequently people are seen as belonging 
to the same or different categories as oneself. 
Partly because the categorization involves a 
simplification and clarification of perception, and 
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partly because there is a motivation to positively 
value the self, differentiation between one's own and 
other category members is often extreme, and biased in 
favour of the ingroup. These factors account for the 
existence of social competition and for the rigid and 
derogatory stereotypes held of outgroups (Hogg and 
Abrams, 1988, pg. 209). 
Not only have these authors pointed out the importance of 
group membership to the social and psychological order in a 
person's life, but also the existence of stereotypes. 
The idea of a constant flux in social categories, 
though, may provide an important insight into modern 
society and multinational corporations. Transnational 
practices of multinational corporations bring about contact 
with foreign influences, though contact is not sufficient 
to bring about a reduction in intergroup hostilities {Hogg 
and Abrams, 1988). This contact with foreign influences, 
though, may have the ability to bring about social change 
(Hancock, 1980), and, according to social identity theory, 
"social-change beliefs may contribute both to the 
maintenance and to the alteration of the status quo ••• " 
(Hogg and Abrams, 1988, pg. 210). This may seem to be 
irrefutable, since a force either changes or does not 
change that which it comes up against, but on closer 
inspection of this idea one sees that maintenance of the 
status quo may actually mean a retrenching of traditional 
values; so, in a sense, maintenance of the status quo may 
actually be change of some kind. In other words, if the 
superordinate group (the in-group) is confronted by a 
subordinate group (the out-group) and it does not accept 
the latter, its status quo will not be changed to the 
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outside observer, but may have actually become even more 
adamant about its own values and beliefs. 7 Also, the 
subordinate group can expect resistance if it does not back 
away from its confrontation with the superordinate group. 
The above summaries do little justice to the breadth 
and depth of these three theoretical perspectives and the 
literature on group formation as a whole (of which there 
are many more theories). These three were chosen for their 
differences and contrasts. Each one has its strengths and 
weaknesses. Sociobiology addresses the existence of strong 
family and clan ties, but theories based on genetic ties 
are hard to expand to groups based on nationality (though 
their authors try). Exchange theory (the type discussed 
here) is good for small groups with little or no blood 
ties, but once again, this theoretical model is stretched 
when used to explain the existence of nationalism. 8 Also, 
7A group does not have to confront another group to 
futher entrench its beliefs and values. Take the example 
of the Doomsday cult and its failure to predict the end of 
the world. Instead of giving up their beliefs when the end 
did not come, they became more unrelenting in their 
beliefs, saying their unwavering faith was the reason the 
earth had been spared (Lofland, 1977). 
8There have been some authors that have used exchange 
theory to explain macroprocesses, namely Richard Emerson 
(Cook, 1987; Turner, 1991). Unfortunately his work in this 
field is concerned mainly with relations between nations, 
which sheds little light on the reasons why a large number 
of people would choose a nation as part of their identity. 
Also, by looking at the relations between nations, I think 
that Emerson has taken a macroprocess which involves many 
people (or more specifically their representatives) and 
turned it into a reified microprocess concerning pieces of 
land. 
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exchange theorists admit that their theory does not 
adequately explain the specific circumstances in which 
coalitions form {Gillmore in cook, 1987). It is only social 
identity theory that can adequately explain both small 
groups (with or without blood ties), as well as large 
groups such as those centered around nationality. 
Since social identity is the theory of choice for me, 
the question as to why nationality is so important to so 
many people can now be addressed. Take an hypothetical 
situation, one that is familiar to the reader. A person is 
traveling outside of his/her native country and meets a 
stranger from yet another country. It so happens that they 
both speak the same language, do the same kind of work, 
share the same ethnic backgrounds, are the same age and 
sex, and enjoy the same hobbies. So what is different 
about these two people? Their nationality. From a social 
identity perspective, this could be enough for them to cast 
the other as an out-group member, especially if these 
people are in need of some positive self value, or their 
respective countries are in some kind of conflict. It is 
not improbable that such meetings could happen. 9 
Nationalism of this sort is not confined just to citizens 
of the U.S. Forbes (1985) noted sociological and 
psychological studies measuring nationalism could be found 
9For example, citizens from the U.S. and Canada could 
meet in a third country (such as Mexico or Germany). It is 
also not unlikely that the only difference that these 
people would have would be their nationality. 
14 
in articles from South Africa, Australia, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, England, Wales, Sweden, 
Lebanon, Tahiti, The cook Islands, Samoa, and Canada. 
Exactly how many people are nationalistic is hard to 
measure, since nationalism is not only an ambiguous term 
(even given the definitions mentioned above), 10 but also 
because people tend to vary in the amount of nationalism 
they espouse depending on both psychological dispositions 
and social situations (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, 
and Sanford, 1950). still, given the amount of time and 
effort spent on the study of nationalism (both directly and 
indirectly) it should be clear that it plays a major role 
. f t' 11 in group orma ion. Recent world events, such as the 
fighting in Bosnia and the debate over the North American 
Free Trade Act (NAFTA), have also shown the salience (and 
importance) of nationality. 12 
1°Forbes notes that nationalism falls somewhere 
between patriotism and xenophobia. For the native, this is 
the difference between rational and irrational love for 
one's country; for the foreigner, both are indications of 
an unwillingness to accept new people. 
11According to the Social Science Index, 90 articles 
dealing with the subject of nationalism were published in 
academic journals between April 1992 and March 1993 
(Ehrens, 1993). (A quick review of other works on this 
subject includes Barclay, 1972; Benson, 1992; Burg, 1993; 
Cornelius, 1993; Deutsch, 1969; Friedman, 1992; Garvey, 
1992; Gelb, 1991; Hoagland, 1992; Hobsbawm, 1991; Joffe, 
1990; Keatley, 1991; Kedourie, 1961; Kis, 1992; Ladd, 1986; 
Leone, 1986; Lewis, 1992; Manning, 1992; Meadwell, 1989; 
Pilon, 1992; Schrage, 1992; Shafer, 1955; Walzer, 1993; 
Ward, 1966.) 
12some may argue that the fighting in the former 
Yugoslavia is not about nationality but about ethnicity, 
but I would argue that the groups were fighting for the 
15 
Work 
Work has to be done .... It has to be done to 
provide food, clothes, shelter, protection from 
enemies without and disruptive elements within, care, 
protection, and education of children, and all the 
elaborate arrangements for entertainment, travel, etc. 
to which we have been accustomed (Argyle, 1989). 
This passage points to the fact that for basic 
survival purposes, most humans have to work. There are 
very few individuals that can escape this reality, to the 
point that their basic survival needs are met with no 
effort of their own. 13 Work is not only essential to meet 
basic survival needs, but may even be necessary for mental 
health14 (Argyle, 1989), as well as for creating new value 
in a capitalist society15 (Wolff, 1984) and a sign from God 
for the redemption of the soul (Aron, 1968). 
right to have their own state. The NAFTA debates, though 
centered around jobs, became a strong anti-Mexico rallying 
point for some strong U.S. and Canadian nationalists. 
13The majority of those in this position are severly 
handicapped, and it could be argued that basic activities 
such as eating and elimination require considerable efforts 
on their parts. 
14This idea of the need to work for mental health 
reasons may be the motivation for people to continue to 
work even when it is not financially necessary. Argyle 
(1989) noted that surveys dealing with such issues found 
well over 50 percent of the people who took part in the 
surveys would continue to work, though some would look for 
different employment. (There is a line of argument that 
work is loathsome, contradictory to Argyle's stance. This 
argument is based on some of Freud's works. See Tausky, 
1992). 
15From a Marxist standpoint, this means that not only 
is work important to the proletariat (for a number of 
reasons, including class consciousness and creativity), but 
also to the bourgeoisie, who can only create new value 
through surplus labor power. 
16 
The idea that work is important not only to feed and 
cloth a person (and possibly his/her family), but also for 
mental health reasons makes it a prime candidate for 
another category on which to base self-identification as 
well as group affiliation. Marx and Engles thought that 
workers in all countries should be part of one group 
([1846] 1972), 16 while others saw workers divided among 
themselves based on occupational (and industry) status 
(Crozier and Friedberg, 1980; Prezeworski and Sprague, 
1986). 17 
Whether workers see themselves as comprising a 
worldwide class, or as smaller occupational groups, there 
is sufficient evidence that work (or what one does for a 
living) has a strong effect on individual personality and 
larger components of society. For example, Kohn (1990) 
stated that "the effect of job conditions on personality 
are far from trivial in magnitude .•• " (pg. 40). According 
16This idea is captured in the famous last line of 
Marx and Engles' Communist Manifesto: Workingmen of all 
countries, unite! ([1846] 1972, pg. 116). Marx and Engles' 
idea of two separate classes in capitalist societies 
(bourgeoisie and proletariat) is further emphasized by 
other Marxists, such as Disraeli who termed these two 
groups as two separate nations (Bottomore in Chambliss, 
1973). 
17some industries hold a higher status than others. 
For example, to be an engineer in the areospace industry is 
likely to carry more status than being an engineer in a 
small tool shop, though both may require the same skills. 
Also, some companies carry more status than others. In the 
Pacific Northwest, the occupational title of Boeing 
Engineer will usually carry more status than, say, Red Ball 
Engineer. 
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to Thompson (1983), "[w]ork has always been necessary to 
satisfy the various social needs that exist in human 
society" (pg. 38). Marx and Engles ([1846] 1970) stated 
that "[men] begin to distinguish themselves from animals as 
soon as they begin to produce their means of 
subsistence ... " (pg. 42, emphasis in the original). Even 
in his utopian (communist/socialist) society, Marx pointed 
out that labor would be a first need of life (Zdravomyslov, 
Rozhin, and Iadov, 1970). When a GE plant in Ontario, CA. 
closed down, a typical response of the displaced workers 
was the feeling that one had lost a family member (Haas, 
1985). 
Sociologists interested in split labor market theory 
anchor their theory on the struggles between workers (with 
differences between workers usually based on race) which 
stem from the workers' fierce loyalties to their work (~ 
Bonacich in Pettigrew, 1980). One of the foremost writers 
on humans and their work, the late Everett c. Hughes, 
pointed out that it is not only self-identification that 
stems from what one does for a living, but also how others 
in society identify individuals: 
•.. a man's work is one of the things by which he is 
judged, and certainly one of the more significant 
things by which he judges himself (pg. 42). 
Many people in our society work in named occupations. 
The names are a combination of price tag and calling 
card (pg. 42) . 
... a man's work is one of the more important parts of 
his social identity, of his self; indeed, of his fate 
in the one life he has to live, for there is something 
almost as irrevocable about choice of occupation as 
there is about choice of mate (pg. 43). 
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•.. the language about work is •.• loaded with value and 
prestige judgments ... (pg. 43). 
These general statements are backed by a number of 
studies done on the unemployed. Argyle (1989) summarized 
some of these studies, and reached the following 
conclusions: 
and 
General emotional disturbance is lower for those at 
work than for all categories of unemployed .... (pg. 
291, emphasis in original). 
Depression is usually found to be higher among the 
unemployed (pg. 292, emphasis in original). 
Suicide is more common among the unemployed (pg. 293 
emphasis in original). 
There is no question that the unemployed are in poorer 
health than the employed (pg. 293). 
All of the above statements make it clear that humans 
need to work for self-fulfillment, and that it has a 
powerful influence on our lives. 18 This account of the 
importance of work could be extended, but little would be 
gained from such an extension. What is important here is 
to note that people will not easily quit work, as it meets 
the needs not only for basic survival, but also for 
positive self values. 19 In other words, when people quit 
working (other than through retirement) it is usually due 
181t is important to note that our non-work lives also 
have a powerful influence over our work (Kohn, 1990). 
19Argyle points to the fact that even people in low 
status occupations will use this occupation to put 
themselves above groups such as the unemployed ("At least I 
have a job.") (1989). 
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to extreme circumstances (Mueller, Wallace, and Price, 
1992). 
Multinational Corporations CMNCs) 
The multinational corporation (MNC) is interesting 
sociologically because it is a place where the importance 
of nationalism and work are combined. It is a place where 
a researcher can test the power of the group label 
"nationalist worker" against the group label "cosmopolitian 
worker," and see which, if any, is more salient to native-
born workers. 
There are few, if any, nations that have not been 
affected by MNCs, both as home and host nations. The 
actual impact of MNCs on any country is hard to measure. 
For example, in 1989 in the U.S., 88,938 foreign-owned 
affiliates reported employing a total of 4,734,500 people. 
The 199120 statistics showed an increase of two percent to 
4,809,200 employees working for foreign-owned firms in the 
U.S •• This accounted for 5.2 percent of the U.S. labor 
force. (U.S.-owned MNCs accounted for an even greater 
number of employees in the u.s. 21 ) Average wage 
compensation for foreign-owned firms operating in the U.S. 
20The 1991 statistics reported were for foreign-owned 
nonbank U.S. affiliates. 
21The actual figures for u.s.-owned MNCs are not 
known, though it is not hard to come to the conclusion that 
these firms employ more U.S. citizens than foreign-owned 
firms, based on the number of u.s.-owned MNCs versus 
foreign-owned MNCs. 
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in 1991 was reported to be $36,200, 26 percent higher than 
U.S. firms (Bezirganian, 1993). The total amount of U.S. 
direct investment abroad is estimated at $776.3 billion 
(market cost), while the three largest foreign investors in 
the U.S. (Japan, 22 the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands) 
accounted for $252.7 billion (Scholl, Lowe, and Bargas, 
1993). The U.S. is (at this time) the largest home and 
host nation for MNCs, but other nations also have large 
investments in MNCs, including Canada and West Germany (two 
countries examined in this study). 
These statistics, though impressive to those who read 
them, do not influence workers as much as popular 
literature. In the U.S. and other nations, headlines, Best 
Sellers, and magazine and newspaper articles carry the 
stories seen and read by many people. The stories 
concerning MNCs vary from high enthusiasm to dark 
pessimism, which means readers may be getting mixed 
signals, unless one viewpoint is more prevalent than the 
other. The following is a summary of the typical stories 
found in U.S. popular literature. 
Arguably, the most salient aspect of MNCs is their 
effect on employment (Nicolaides, 1991). 23 In their best 
selling book, The New Competitors, Glickman and Woodward 
(1989) argued that between 1977 and 1986, u.s.-owned MNCs 
22Nineteen-ninety-two was the first year Japan held 
the largest position of foreign investment in the U.S .• 
23This is true for most countries, not just the U.S. 
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accounted for a loss of 2.7 million jobs, while foreign-
owned MNCs resulted in a net loss of 55,863 jobs between 
1982 and 1986. 24 The fear of loss of jobs is also the 
rallying cry for many opponents of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (McGinn and Moody, 1993; Rothstein, 
1991). Newspapers and magazines with wide readerships such 
as The Christian Science Monitor, The Washington Post, The 
Wall Street Journal, and Fortune, 25 have carried numerous 
articles on the detrimental effect on employment of u.s.-
based MNCs. At the same time, these same newspapers and 
magazines have also run articles stressing the importance 
of both foreign-based and U.S.-based MNCs in creating 
jobs. 26 These arguments are compounded by a third 
viewpoint, in which MNCs have a net effect close to zero 
24This loss, according to Glickman and Woodward, can 
be attributed to a number of factors, including downsizing 
and the fact that foreign-owned MNCs are many times 
vertically integrated in the home country. 
25These newspapers and magazines themselves may not be 
read by many working class people, but the stories carried 
in these publications are copied in many other local 
newspapers around the nation. 
26For example, compare the following headlines: From 
The Wall Street Journal -- "New Studies Refute Fears of 
Foreign Investment" (October 1, 1991, pg. A22) vs. 
"Overseas Calling: American firms send office workers 
abroad to use cheaper labor" (August 14, 1991, pg. Al); or 
The Oregonian -- "Pickets Protest Foreign Cars" (with an 
accompany story regarding the picketers fears of job 
exports) (February 11, 1192, pg. 06) vs. "North American 
Free Trade Talks: Boon or bane?" (with an accompanying 
story of how NAFTA will create numerous jobs in Oregon) 
(January 25, 1993, pg. 07). 
22 
(Graham and Krugman, 1991). 27 
Another salient issue with MNCs is that of national 
security (and the transfer of technology). 28 Should 
foreign-based firms be allowed to buy (in this case) U.S. 
high-tech companies such as aerospace and weapons 
companies? Again, there is little consensus in the popular 
literature. Ohmae, in his best seller The Borderless World 
(1990), promotes the idea that companies (and nations) can 
no longer think in terms of national boundaries when 
dealing in the global economy. This viewpoint can be 
contrasted with articles carried by The New York Times 
(Bradsher, 1993; Zakheim, 1990), Los Angeles Times (1992), 
and Time Magazine (Van Voorst, 1992). These latter 
articles are filled with stories of how the U.S. is selling 
27Graham and Krugman base their findings on the 
macroeconomics of employment determined by supply, not 
demand. In their own words: 
Suppose, for example, that a wave of FDI 
[foreign direct investment] into the United States 
turned out to have a substantial immediate 
positive effect on demand for US workers. The 
normal response of the Federal Reserve would be to 
tighten monetary policy to avoid accelerating 
inflation, so that any job gains resulting from 
the investment would be off set by job losses 
elsewhere. Conversely, a wave of investment that 
had a negative impact of the demand for labor 
would be met by looser monetary policy and thus be 
offset by job gains elsewhere (pg. 61). 
This kind of argument can be also be applied to outgoing 
FDI. 
28once again, this concern is not relegated to just 
the U.S. 
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off its ability to defend itself; that it will soon be an 
easy target for attack. 
The ability of MNCs to evade taxes also receives 
plenty of attention in popular books, newspapers, and 
magazines. Glickman and Woodward point out that many 
foreign-owned firms know that states will bid for them, and 
one of the bargaining chips is that of tax breaks (1989). 
Articles in the leading national newspapers and magazines 
have also touched on the evasive powers of both foreign-
based and U.S.-based MNCs when it comes to paying taxes 
(Gleckman, 1990; Heins, 1986; Hilzenrath, 1993; Martz, 
1991; Mcintyre, 1989; Moskowitz, 1991). 
These are not the only issues raised by the popular 
literature in regard to MNCs. 29 The overall power of MNCs 
is frequently cited (Brannigan, 1990; Grieder, 1992; Piel, 
1992). The recent sale of the Seattle Mariners to Japanese 
investors (Ninetendo) caused a stir in professional 
baseball. MNCs vs. anti-trust laws are also part of the 
literature, as are social policies (should MNCs be 
concerned with host countries' problems?). Each of these 
issues has both its opponents and proponents. This makes 
it extremely difficult to say where most readers would 
stand on these issues (and the issue of MNCs in general) 
29A popular fictional book and movie that was released 
at the time of this study was Michael Crichton's Rising Sun 
(the book was published in 1992). The statement that 
"business is war" sums up the Crighton's depiction of 
Japanese businessmen, evoking images of Pearl Harbor and 
World war II. 
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.,. 
without some kind of survey. Fortunately there have been 
some surveys on this matter. 
One was done in 1988 by Smick-Medley and associates 
and the results were reported in the 1988 May/June issue of 
The International Economy (U.S. attitudes toward foreign 
investment, 1988). Respondents to this survey were 
categorized into two groups -- Masses and Elites. Elites 
consisted of people such as Congressmen, mayors, and 
corporate leaders, and Masses are all those who are not 
part of at least one of the above categories, in other 
words, ordinary "working class" people. Approximately 100 
Elites and 900 members of the working class took part in 
this survey. Both the questions and results of the survey 
are shown in TABLE I. 
TABLE I 
U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1) 30 
Foreign Investors: Masses (%) 
Yes No DK 
Elites (%) 
Yes No DK 
Can cause a financial crisis 
by withdrawing their money 
from U.S. banks 
Might pull their money out 
at any time 
Have more influence in 
our national government 
Cause Americans to have 






5 55 42 
3 39 61 
4 55 41 
3 39 58 
30source for TABLES I and II, U.S. attitudes toward 







U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1) 
(continued) 
Masses (%) 
Yes No DK 
Elites (%) 
Yes No DK 
If Foreigners Owned Your Bank: 
Would you get higher rates 
on your account? 17 
Would it affect your ability 
to get a loan? 23 
Would it jeopardize the safety 
of your savings account? 41 
What to Do About Foreign Investment: 
Prohibit any further 
investment 
Register foreign investors 
Limit foreign investment in 
the U.S. 
Encourage joint ventures 















22 4 80 15 
16 4 82 14 
14 3 90 7 
6 1 99 0 
3 48 45 8 
4 13 86 1 
6 70 25 6 
4 52 40 8 
These survey results show that there is no one set of ideas 
about MNCs in the U.S., and that there is a large 
differential between Elites and Masses. 31 This is further 
supported by the last question asked in the survey, which 
can be found in TABLE II (page 27). 
As can be seen, the numbers show the disparity between 
the Masses and the Elites. Marx would probably have found 




U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENT (2) 
If foreigners bought the firm 





















The second survey was a New York Times/CBS News Poll, 
which appeared in The New York Times on July 10, 1990 
(Oreskes, 1990). It differed in two ways from the Smick-
Medley survey: Respondents were not categorized in any 
way, and questions were asked only about Japan's investment 
in the U.S. One thousand-eighty-four people were asked to 
respond to a series of statements, two of which are shown 
below (TABLE III, page 28), accompanied with the percentage 
of the people who answered "yes" to the statements. 
People who took part in this survey said that they were 
beginning to fear Japanese economic might more so than 
32The total percentages of both groups do not equal 
100 percent, but 84 percent for the Masses and 72 percent 
for the Elites. It can only be assumed that the numbers 
were copied wrong, or a category was left out of the final 
report (such as a "Don't Know" category). 
33These findings are not universally accepted. 
Partner (1992) says that the fear of foreigners 
(specifically the fear of Japanese) goes beyond "the man on 
the street." One of the phobias he discusses is Japanese 




U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARDS JAPANESE 
Statement 
Japanese compete unfairly in business 
Most Americans look down on Japanese 
Soviet military power. 
% of "yes" answers 
38 
4734 
These surveys, though, leave many stories untold. How 
do the people who are directly affected (i.e., the workers 
within the MNCs) feel about the role of MNCs? It may be 
that a large percentage of U.S. citizens are fearful of 
foreign investors (and of foreigners taking jobs away from 
U.S. workers), but, if this is true, does it hold for U.S. 
workers employed within these entities? What about other 
countries? For example, the three countries that will be 
examined in this study have all been home and host 
countries to MNCs. Will their workers embrace or eschew 
foreign direct investment? In the following chapter 
(Chapter Three) I will discuss this problem in more detail, 
as well as formulate my main hypothesis. Chapter Four will 
deal with methods of data retrieval. 
34when the pollsters posed this same statement to 
Japanese about their attitudes towards Americans, 48 
percent answered "yes." 
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CHAPTER III 
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM 
The preceding chapter made it clear that the worker 
within the multinational corporation is worthy of study. 
MNCs are one of the few social institutions that cross 
national boundaries. The other two types of social 
institutions that typically crossover international borders 
are national governments and voluntary organizations. 1 The 
former, though not necessarily violent, usually brings with 
it strong feelings of nationalism on the parts of both the 
host and home countries involved. This may be obvious in 
the case of an invading army, 2 but this is also generally 
true of embassies and visiting governmental dignitaries. 
Since nationalism is a strong motivational device for 
labeling in- and out-group members, this makes any kind of 
national governmental body an unlikely harbinger of 
welcomed social change. 3 The latter, voluntary 
1This leaves out individuals and small groups such as 
tourists. such individuals and small groups are not 
considered social institutions. I also leave out the 
United Nations, since it is still trying to adapt to its 
transnational role. 
2This has also been the case with most United Nation 
peacekeeping operations. 
3This is clearly visible in third party "Peace Talks." 
Even a neutral nation can be seen as taking sides with one 
organizations, are too varied in nature to generalize from 
one kind to another (~ Peace Corps vs. The Jesuits; 
these two groups are both voluntary groups with 
international linkages, but their goals are not the same). 
MNCs, on the other hand, do have two things in common --
the search for profits, and they employ foreign workers at 
some point in their operations. This makes it possible to 
compare across companies from different countries, 
operating in different countries, and engaged in many 
different areas of production. 
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The fact that MNCs employ foreign workers does not 
mean that all individual workers are the same, even if all 
worked for MNCs. Kohn (1991} points out 14 different 
aspects of work that can affect workers' attitudes toward 
their jobs. 4 Aspects of work such as average number of 
hours worked per week and dirtiness of the job are not the 
same in all MNCs. Someone working for an international 
bank is probably not going to have the same feelings toward 
work as someone who works for an international ditch 
digging company. Work conditions and individual workers' 
perspectives of work conditions are not going to be 
party or the other, and this can even be a criticism from 
both sides! 
4These fourteen aspects are ownership, 
bureaucratization, hierarchial position, substantive 
complexity of work, closeness of supervision, degree of 
routinization, time pressure, heaviness, dirtiness, the 
number of hours worked in the average week, being held 
responsible for things outside one's control, risk of 
losing one's job, job protections, and job income. 
comparable across MNCs, but what about the overall 
attitudes of workers toward MNCs? Is it true, as Maxcy 
(1981) put it, that economic man (hereafter referred to as 
"economic person") has no nationality?5 Can MNC workers 
be considered as economic persons, or only the capitalists 
who are the driving force behind MNCs?6 
The idea that workers may not be classified as 
"economic persons" forms the basis for my main hypothesis. 
True economic persons would be indifferent to the national 
currency of profits or paychecks. If workers are true 
economic persons, their only concern would be that they 
receive fair pay (or some other kind of compensation) for 
fair work. Since many foreign-owned MNCs pay higher wages 
than both indigenous MNCs and domestic businesses, this 
would seem to be even more of an incentive for workers to 
welcome these companies. Therefore, my main hypothesis is 
as follows: 
• If a person is employed within a foreign-owned MNC, 
then he/she will have a positive attitude towards 
foreign-owned MNCs (or at least a more positive 
5This idea is supported by Frank (1980). The CEOs in 
his study were very adamant about the home country 
government staying out of their business dealings in host 
countries. See also Chapter Five in Maxcy's book on the 
automobile MNCs' interests during World War Two. 
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6The 'driving force' mentioned here is not to be 
confused with the labor power that generates the products 
and/or services provided by the MNCs -- that comes from the 
workers. The 'driving force' generated by the capitalists 
is the search for profits that transends national 
boundaries. 
attitude when compared to those not employed by 
foreign-owned MNCs). 
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But, as seen in the last chapter, nationalism is a 
strong group label. Is it strong enough to override well 
paying work? By hypothesizing that the workers' way of 
life will be satisfied by the foreign-owned MNC, a null 
hypothesis would point out that either foreign-owned MNCs 
do not satisfy workers' expectations for adequate wages 
(and other work variables such as safety and benefits) or 
that workers are not economic persons, and that 
nationalistic pride has given them reason to find fault 
with foreign-owned MNCs (and possibly home-based MNCs as 
well). If the former is true, then possibly the MNCs could 
gain worker loyalty through higher wages (and/or added 
benefits). If the latter is true, there is little foreign-
owned MNCs can do to convince native workers to welcome 
them, and they will have to continually fight to win the 
loyalties of these workers (possibly by trying to win the 
favor of national leaders). If the hypothesis turns out to 
be supported in each case under study, then it is quite 
possible that MNC workers are truly economic persons. 
Either way, the study of large group label formation, as 
well as social identity theory, will have been taken a 
small step forward. 
To test the above hypothesis, it will be necessary to 
construct a nationalistic structure of each country being 
studied. Measuring the workers' attitudes with only 
quantitative scales paints only half of a picture. What is 
still needed is a national context in which to place such 
findings. This is the only way to present a solid (though 
still incomplete) 7 foundation of the workers' life 
experiences in regard to foreign direct investment at the 
time of the studies. In the next chapter, I will discuss 
those aspects that will be included in this study, the 
logic behind my choices, and the data which will be used. 
7This incompleteness comes from not knowing the 
individuals' total life experiences. Age, education, 
family views, and so forth would play some part in a 
person's attitudes in most, if not all, areas. All I can 
hope to do is understand those aspects that are readily 
available to the outside observer. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODS AND TECHNIQUES 
Quantitative data have already been collected and 
analyzed for MNC workers' attitudes (the dependent variable 
in this study) in the three countries that I will be 
studying -- Canada, Brazil, and West Germany. Marton 
questioned Canadian workers employed by Ford Canada in 
1971; Blake and Driscoll reported survey results from 
Brazilian workers employed by two u.s.-owned paper/pulp 
mills in 1974, 1 and Sauvant and Mennis studied German 
workers within West German MNCs in 1976 (both foreign- and 
domestic-owned). 2 What is missing is a larger (national) 
context in which these studies can be set and examined more 
closely. 
Through available materials (such as the New York 
Times Index, government documents, books, and periodicals), 
a nationalistic structure (context) will be constructed for 
each country. There could be many variables within a 
national context that could affect workers' attitudes 
1A Brazilian research firm -- Demanda Instituto de 
Pesquisas e Estudos de Mercado Ltda. -- administered the 
actual questionnaires. 
2All of the above studies can be found in Fayerweather 
{1982). 
toward MNCs. 3 I will confine my study to six that 
generally get media coverage (or influence it), and, 
therefore, would be easily accessible to the work force of 
a country. 4 The six independent variables will include: 
(1) national political leaders' attitudes toward foreign 
investment and aid (both inward and outward), (2) military 
activities involving each country (once again, both inward 
and outward), (3) strikes and/or worker unrest within the 
countries, (4) Gross National Product (GNP), (5) GNP per 
capita, and (6) unemployment statistics. 5 
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These variables may not be the most important ones for 
a business person to examine when deciding whether or not 
to undertake foreign investment, but I see them as possibly 
the most salient in the media, and, therefore, to the 
average worker. First of all, most media organizations 
assign one (or more) of their best reporters to cover 
political leaders (e.g. presidents, foreign ministers, 
cabinet members), which means that their statements and 
3There could also be many individual variables as 
well, such as military service, family background, 
education, and so forth, but these do not explain 
widespread tendencies. 
4This is not to say that an authoritarian government 
would allow coverage of an embarassing worker uprising, but 
given enough media coverage elsewhere (and foreign media 
coverage was widespread by the 1970s), there is a great 
likelihood that other workers within that country would 
find out about the uprising. 
5wage rates may be another important factor, but 
unless workers are aware that they make more or less than 
others in comparable situations this kind of information 
would be of little help. 
actions are news. When such leaders speak on the subject 
of foreign aid and/or investment, not only does the 
coverage become more widespread, but so does the analyses 
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of such news. This is due to the fact that national 
leaders are usually seen by a majority of the citizens as 
embodying all that the nation stands for, so their dealings 
with other nations are closely watched to make sure they 
fit in with the citizens' ideas of what they should be 
doing. In other words, if a majority of a nation's 
citizens feel that another nation should be dealt with 
harshly, but their national leader(s) treats this nation 
with compassion, this leader will probably be seen as weak 
or selling out his/her homeland. If this leader continues 
to treat the other nation with compassion and can convince 
his/her constituency that there are good reasons for such 
treatment, it may be that the citizens will change their 
point of view. If not, this leader may find him-/herself 
without a constituency. Because of the gravity of the 
situation in national relations, and the amount of media 
coverage such stories receive, I think that by studying the 
national leaders' attitudes toward foreign aid and/or 
investment I can ascertain the general feeling on this 
subject within a nation. My first supporting hypothesis, 
then, is: 
• If national leaders voice positive views towards 
foreign investment and/or intervention, then foreign-
owned MNC workers will have positive attitudes toward 
foreign-owned MNCs. 
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As with national leaders, military activities are 
heavily covered by the media and reflect national attitudes 
(though not necessarily universal, a majority of a nation's 
citizenry will usually back their military). For example, 
in the U.S. during the Persian Gulf War, the outpouring of 
support for then President George Bush's actions against 
Iraq could be seen in the popularity polls that gave Bush 
his highest rating during his Presidential term. Though 
pacifists have been opposed to every major war in the 
Twentieth Century, including the Persian Gulf War, they are 
usually a small minority once military action has been 
taken. For this reason, if military action is taking place 
(or has recently) within the nations under study I can 
expect strong feelings of nationalism, and a negative view 
towards foreign aid and investment (both incoming and 
outgoing). This strong nationalism could possibly be 
neutralized by national leaders saying that the military 
activity is a necessary gesture of some kind (~ the 
restoration of democracy) and should not be seen as a 
'national' statement. In such a case, citizens may view 
the majority of citizens of the other nation as unfortunate 
recipients of bad luck (or bad leaders) and should not be 
seen as enemies per se. Inward military activity would, in 
almost every case, generate extreme nationalistic 
attitudes. 6 In relation to my main hypothesis, my second 
supporting hypothesis is: 
If a nation is experiencing military intervention 
of some kind (inward or outward), then foreign-owned 
MNC workers will show negative attitudes toward 
foreign-owned MNCs. 7 
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Strikes and worker unrest do not usually receive the 
type and amount of coverage given to national leaders and 
military operations, but the word "strike" (when used in 
conjunction with work and workers) carries a highly 
emotional charge. Strikes, no matter what the issue or 
players involved, are often thought of as pitting exploited 
workers against exploiting owner(s). It can be expected 
that if a high number of strikes take place within the 
countries (and especially in foreign-owned MNCs) that the 
MNC workers' attitudes would be anti-MNC (for that matter, 
anti-business), even if they are not involved within a 
strike. An interesting aspect of strikes within MNC work 
forces is whether workers employed by the same company (or 
6The bombing of London and Germany during WWII are 
prime examples of such military tactics that brought about 
extreme nationalistic views among the victims of the 
attacks (Seabury and Codevilla, 1989). Abbott (1988) notes 
that the same thing happened in Haiti during the U.S. 
occupation (1915-1933). 
7This second supplemental hypothesis cannot be worded 
in the affirmative since an absence of military 
intervention would not necessarily bring about positive 
attitudes towards MNCs. The nationality of the other 
country would matter very little in this situation, as 
relations with this other country are based mainly on 
hostilities. 
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same industry) in different countries would be likely to 
sympathize with each other during strikes. This was not 
the case in Dutch-based industries operating in India 
(Banaji and Hensman, 1990), or in the 1994 longshoremen 
strike in Canada. In the former, the workers in the 
different countries did not communicate during times of 
strikes (though the authors felt this would have improved 
the working environment for both parties), and in the 
latter, goods being shipped to Canadian ports were diverted 
to U.S. ports and shipped to Canada on overland routes. If 
this is the general tendency in such cases, it points out 
that workers are not seeing themselves on an international 
scale. 8 This leads me to my third supporting hypothesis: 
• If there is a small number9 of strikes within a 
nation, then foreign-owned MNC workers will have 
positive attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs. 
The causal relationship stated in this hypothesis 
could run in either direction -- positive attitudes could 
lead to fewer strikes. Though this may be true, I think 
that if an industry or country is plagued by strikes, even 
8It is interesting to note that MNC owners (or CEOs, 
or whoever is in charge) frequently transfer work to other 
operations in other countries during strikes (Kujawa, 
1979). Whether or not this practice is the cause for the 
workers' willingness to do the work of other striking 
workers is worth investigating. 
9An actual number is hard to pinpoint, and so the 
ambiguous term 'small number'. Though this could be just 
about any number, I will consider a nation to have 
experienced a small number of strikes if less than 200 were 
reported within a year. 
if foreign-owned MNCs are not directly involved, all 
workers could be anxious. This anxiety could be 
exacerbated within the foreign-owned MNC by knowing that 
labor negotiations are (possibly) carried out in another 
country. 
Gross National Product {GNP) is not something that 
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workers constantly see or hear within the media, but, 
because it is a leading economic indicator used by national 
leaders to gauge the economic strength of a country, it is 
mentioned often or used as a basis for a speech and/or 
political campaign. For this reason, I will make this part 
of my national equation. My fourth supporting hypothesis 
is as follows: 
• If GNP is rising, then foreign-owned MNC workers 
will show positive attitudes toward foreign-owned 
MNCs. 
I separated GNP and GNP per capita because while GNP 
may be increasing arithmetically, the population of a 
nation may be increasing geometrically, and, therefore, the 
GNP per capita would be shrinking. 10 If this is true, or 
for some other reason GNP per capita is falling or rising 
slower than GNP, then foreign-owned MNC workers will 
espouse negative attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs. To 
rephrase this as my fifth supporting hypothesis: 
10In the data analysis and testing of hypotheses, GNP 
and GNP per capita may be treated jointly, though they will 
have different values. 
If GNP per capita is rising at least as fast as 
GNP, then foreign-owned MNCS workers will have 
positive attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs. 
Employment is one of the major concerns when talking 
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about MNCs (Nicolaides, 1991), and therefore would gain 
much media exposure. 11 Though the effect of MNCs on 
employment is still hotly contested (as shown in Chapter II 
above), it would seem that if a nation's unemployment rate 
were high, any firm (including MNCs) offering jobs would be 
considered to be doing a good service for the country and 
its workers. My sixth supporting hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
If unemployment within a nation is high, 12 foreign-
owned MNC workers would have positive attitudes toward 
foreign-owned MNCs. 13 
Each of the above independent variables will be 
considered sufficient to cause positive or negative 
11unemployment rates or trends do not have to involve 
MNCs to get media coverage. As with GNP, unemployment 
rates are used as a major economic indicator (at all levels 
of an economy). This tends to exacerbate employment 
effects of MNCs. 
12once again, what is considered high unmemployment? 
I will choose six percent, since this is the high end of 
what economists within the U.S. say is the average rate of 
unemployment. Though I am not studying the U.S., I am 
using U.S. concepts when reporting unemployment rates. 
13As with the second hypothesis, low unemployment does 
not necessarily mean negative attitudes. If a country is 
experiencing low unemployment, then more weight should be 
given to another variable. 
attitudes separately, 14 but not necessary. Unfortunately, 
it is not easy to treat each one separately, as they are 

























High strik~ activity 
Figure 1. Model of hypothesized interactions of 
independent variables on dependent variable. 
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Elections can be won or lost over employment issues, which 
in turn may be tied to military activities and/or GNP 
figures. High unemployment may cause those still working 
to strike for guaranteed employment rights. I will present 
each independent variable separately when possible, but the 
14Except the absense of military action, which is 
hypothesized to have no effect on the workers. 
43 
nature of these variables does not always give me that 
opportunity. This should not be regarded as negatively 
affecting the study, as separating interdependent variables 
may have the affect of emphasizing or de-emphasizing them 
by taking them out of context, which would render them 
ineffective (atomistic fallacy), though the supporting 
hypotheses will be presented both separately and in 
combination. 
Finally, a time frame must be set. Attitudes do not 
form in a vacuum -- historical events play a part, nor are 
they static -- the social identity paradigm allows for 
shifts in attitudes. For this reason, I will not trace the 
leaders, military activities, or strike histories of each 
nation back to the nations' inceptions. Each of these will 
be traced back two years before each study and the year in 
which the study took place, while GNP, GNP per capita, and 
unemployment rates will be traced back four years plus the 
year of the study. Though attitudes are formed over a 
lifetime, these time frames allow for some lag time impacts 
on attitudes -- an important feature in social identity 
theory, as well as immediacy effects. I turn now to the 
actual data analysis and testing of the supporting 
hypotheses. 
CHAPTER V 
DATA ANALYSIS AND POSSIBLE DISCREPANCIES 
I will try to reconstruct each nation separately by 
first looking at the independent variables that are treated 
in a qualitative manner. Because I think it is important 
to closely examine each country, some of the narrative may 
seem redundant. Hopefully this will not be the case 
throughout, but it is imperative that the reader be fully 
aware of cultural, political, and societal events that were 
taking place during the times when the questionnaires were 
administered. Events that may now seem trivial may have 
had major impacts on the respondents. When the independent 
variables are treated in a quantitative manner (such as GNP 
figures), I will present them separately (after the former) 
in tabular form. 1 This will be followed by how my 
supporting hypotheses would predict the workers' attitudes 
toward foreign-owned MNCs, the results of the studies 
involving the MNC workers, and whether my supporting 
hypotheses predicted the actual outcomes. 
1All the information given for each country has been 
taken from The New York Times Index, unless otherwise 
specified. 
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Also, though I have chosen to study the two years 
prior to and the year the questionnaires were administered 
for each country (three years total), 2 it is imperative 
that I spend a short amount of time on some general history 
of each country that may have played a part in the workers' 
attitudes. Any sociological study, longitudinal or 
otherwise, is lacking due to historical shortfalls -- this 
one included. The brief general histories are presented 
here to try to alleviate some of this deficiency. 
CANADA 
General History 
Foreign direct investment to Canada (especially from 
the U.S.) has been strong since the mid 1800s. Serving a 
small market in a large geographical area did not suit 
Canada's late starting industrial firms, though U.S. 
factories had by this time achieved economies of scale that 
made it possible for them to service Canadian markets. In 
1872, the Canadian government helped this process with 
passage of the Patent Act, which made companies who 
received patents in Canada use that patent within two years 
after issue. Since U.S. companies were so far ahead of 
Canadian firms in research and development, they took 
advantage of this new law. This continued well into the 
Twentieth Century -- Canadians received only five percent 
2A total of five years for GNP, GNP per capita, and 
unemployment rates. 
of patents issued between 1968 and 1969, while the U.S. 
received sixty-seven percent and other countries twenty-
eight percent (Niosi, 1985). 
Another act passed by the Canadian government that 
encouraged foreign direct investment was the Tariff Act of 
1879. The resulting tariff measures forced many U.S. 
companies to bypass the tariffs by setting up MNCs. This 
was to shift later, but the immediate result was the 
overwhelming presence of foreign firms (mainly U.S.) in 
many sectors of the Canadian economy {Niosi, 1985). 3 
46 
In 1965, the U.S. and Canada signed a trade agreement 
covering automotive manufacturing concerns in both 
countries. 4 The Canadian automotive industry had been 
inefficient after World War II, and looked to its southern 
neighbor to strengthen this sector. The U.S. had become 
the number one car manufacturer in the world after WWII, 
and its invitation into Canada was met with open arms by 
many Canadians. Between the signing of the agreement in 
1965 and 1973, Canada's automotive production increased 
tremendously. This increase was accompanied by sizable 
increases in employment within the sector. Canadian 
autoworkers gained wage parity with U.S. autoworkers during 
this time as well. These two factors (production and 
3Foreign capital investments in Canada for 1969-1971, 
the period under study, was as follows (millions U.S.$): 
1969 -- 41,602; 1970 -- 44,037; and, 1971 -- 46,250. 
4Ford Canada, which employed the workers questioned, 
was established in 1904 (Maxcy, 1981). 
employment increases) gave most Canadians reason to feel 
comfortable with the agreement, but there were those that 
felt the U.S. had overstepped its boundaries and even more 
workers could be employed if Canadians were doing the 
hiring. Plus, governmental inducements and incentives for 
U.S. companies caused small schisms to appear between the 
signatories of the agreement (Maxcy, 1980). Since the 
workers questioned were employed by Ford Canada, these 
matters may have influenced perceptions of their employer. 
Politics 
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Much resentment towards the U.S. (and U.S. 
investments) could be found in Canada between 1969 and 
1971, though this animosity was not aimed at all foreign 
countries. Early in 1969, Minister Edgar J. Benson said 
that domestic fears of Canadian economic subordination to 
the U.S. may have some basis, and Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau backed this with the notion that some sectors 
needed to be protected from foreign investments and started 
talks on a ban on foreign ownership. This came on the 
heels of a small economic boom in the Western Provinces 
that was spurred by Japanese investments. Some feared 
these investments, but Trudeau said such (Japanese) 
investments were inevitable. This apparent contradiction 
points out that Trudeau and his government may not have 
been so worried about foreign investment as long as it did 
not come from the U.S. 
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After Canadian officials made it clear that they 
believed Canada had better long-run economic potential than 
the U.S., the Canadian Cabinet approved a bill in 1969 that 
would create the Canada Development Corporation. Though 
this organization was to oversee all foreign investments, 
it was clear that it was specifically directed towards U.S. 
investments. Since much of U.S. investments could be found 
in existing firms, Canadians were fearful of U.S. investors 
continuing this pattern and taking over what would, in all 
regards, be turnkey operations for U.S. firms. This would 
mean less capital going to sectors such as construction. 
The Canada Development Corporation was meant to mobilize 
Canadian funds to stave off such ventures. Some even felt 
it should be used to cleanse the country of all U.S. 
investments. Though the Corporation would not materialize 
until 1971, a high level effort was begun to minimize U.S. 
investments. 
Minimizing U.S. investments in Canada was not easy. 
Shortly after the bill was passed to establish the Canada 
Development Corporation, Trudeau was again facing public 
pressure to immediately halt continued U.S. investments. 
Some even called for nationalizing some sectors, though 
this was quickly turned down by the government. Not only 
did Trudeau and his government have to appease the public, 
but he was also getting bad news from the academic world. 
One study showed that Canadians had not thought deeply 
about U.S. economic control through u.s.-owned 
subsidiaries. Now Canadians were being told that effects 
of U.S. economic domination could possibly be worse than 
they had feared. 
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Whether to divert internal concerns over U.S. economic 
control, or possibly as a statement to the U.S. and 
concerned Canadian citizens that he, Trudeau, was in charge 
of Canada, he made it publicly known that talks were to 
begin with Communist China. The U.S. voiced its concern 
over this decision, resulting in a Washington o.c. visit by 
Trudeau to discuss Canadian and U.S. policies with 
President Richard Nixon. After the meeting, Trudeau 
announced that Canada would continue to have friendly ties 
with the U.S., but that Canada must pursue independent 
policies from that of its southern neighbor. Talks with 
China were immanent. 
Trudeau's critics called the U.S. visit inconclusive, 
but shortly thereafter Trudeau began talks with Peking, 
saying Canada was moving away from being a U.S.- and 
European-oriented nation. Benson reiterated this sentiment 
by saying that Canada was not a political satellite of any 
other country, and need not worry about the U.S.'s dislike 
of talks with Peking. Trudeau not only felt that Peking 
was important to Canada's future, but that Asia in general, 
as well as Latin America, were important. Trudeau pointed 
to the growing amount of trade between Canada and Japan as 
an example of other countries' importance. 
Unfortunately for Canada, beginning diplomatic talks 
with Peking meant the possiblity of severing existing ties 
with Taiwan (Nationalist China). This is what happened, at 
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least for a short time. Taiwan was not ready to trade with 
a country that seemed so intent on pursuing friendly ties 
with its nemesis and quickly severed ties with Canada. 
This meant that not all of Asia was ready to negotiate with 
Canada (or at least not all at the same time). Still, 
Canada continued talks with Peking throughout 1969, though 
little progress was made. 
Not only did Canada begin diplomatic ties with Peking 
in 1969, it also openly courted the u.s.s.R. Soviet 
Foreign Minister Gromyko toured Ottawa, much to the 
displeasure of U.S. officials. Again, observers felt this 
was aimed at distancing Canadian foreign relations policies 
from those of the U.S. Whether or not this was the goal of 
Trudeau's administration, it was obvious that the U.S. was 
not welcomed with open arms. This could be seen in the 
opposition mounted against Phillip Morris' offer to buy 
fifty percent of Canadian Breweries Ltd. common stock. The 
deal was defeated. Canadian officials were even quick to 
point out that they were increasing their foreign aid to 
poor countries while the U.S. lowered its foreign aid, 
though the U.S. was still higher in absolute figures. 
Canada's anti-u.s. measures (in the economic realm) 
continued in 1970. After U.S. officials noted that the 
U.S. and Canada needed to become a trading bloc (without 
jeopardizing Canada's sovereignty), and that MNCs were the 
best way to turn Canada's natural resources into capital, 
Canada officials refused to allow a U.S. company to buy 
controlling interest in Canada's largest uranium mine. 
This move was seen as an intensification of economic 
nationalism on the part of Trudeau. Shortly after this, 
the U.S. once again sent Canadians (officials and citizens 
alike) scrambling when the Commerce Department forecast a 
massive rise in U.S. investments going north -- close to 
$2.7 billion. 
51 
The economic nationalist's increasing cries for 
government intervention on behalf of a separate Canadian 
economy -- two-thirds of manufacturing and mining 
industries in Canada were foreign owned in 1970 with the 
U.S. owning well over half of the latter and almost as much 
of the former -- seemed to be getting through to Canadian 
officials. Minister John James Greene said that the U.S. 
must prepare for a Canada that would have stringent control 
over all foreign investments, no matter what the industry. 
Some Canadians began to be worried about domestic security 
firms and felt that foreign companies had no right to 
ownership of these firms. A proposed sale of Ryerson 
Press, Canada's oldest publishing house, to U.S.-owned 
McGraw Hill was adamantly opposed and eventually fell 
through. When a cry went out that U.S. interests were 
buying up recreational lands, economic nationalists were 
quick to play up the concern. Pravada, U.S.S.R.'s official 
government newpaper, added fuel to the economic 
nationalists' fires by reporting anxiety within the 
u.s.s.R. over U.S. business ties in Canada. 
Government-level talks between Canada and the U.S. 
oscillated precipitously. In the midst of cries for 
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economic nationalism and measures to curb U.S. investment, 
Canadian officials seemed torn between wanting less U.S. 
capital and needing more to keep the Canadian economy 
growing. Though many new policies were seen as restricting 
new U.S. investments, a government report on future foreign 
policy noted that the U.S. would remain Canada's closest 
friend and ally (this latter word may be key to why the 
report was written in such a way). The report, though, 
said the two countries must be distinct, and that ties with 
Europe, Asia, and Latin America must be nurtured. 
Canadians also showed dissatisfaction with President Nixon 
when he did not mention Canada in his State of the World 
Message, and were less than pleased with a visit from the 
U.S. Under Secretary. In Toronto, a firebomb was thrown 
through the U.S. consulate's window as some Canadians acted 
out their displeasure over U.S. presence. Still the two 
nations did come together to start a joint venture to curb 
drunk driving, although this may seem insignificant in 
light of the turbulence in economic matters. 
Canada's other foreign policy decisions were aimed at 
continuing the increase of foreign aid and continuing to 
nurture ties with Communist China. After twenty months of 
diplomatic talks, Canada did recognize Peking. Many 
Canadians, both in Trudeau's and the opposition's party, 
saw this as a sign of gaining independence from the U.S. 
Shortly afterwards, Canada sent an envoy to China, though 
the move was not reciprocated. Canada's ties with Taiwan 
took a complete turn during these relations. First, Taiwan 
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reversed its decision to severe economic ties with Canada, 
saying the talks with Peking had no impact on their 
relations. But then, immediately after Peking was 
recognized, Taiwan did severe ties. Also, though Nixon was 
to travel to Peking shortly after Canada recognized Peking, 
the U.S. made it known that this new diplomatic 
relationship would not affect U.S. policies toward 
Communist China or Canada. Canada was actively seeking 
opportunities for overseas investments as well. The 
Canadian International Development Agency, which granted 
moneys for exploratory and feasibility studies for Canadian 
firms looking to invest overseas, was established in 1970 
(Niosi, 1985). The Development Corporation followed in 
1971. 
After 1971, the Development Corporation became a 
permanent part of the Canadian landscape. 5 Its development 
was slow, however, because some Canadian businessmen saw 
anti-u.s. economic policies as hurting Canada's economy, 
especially after the OECD stated that Canada would continue 
to be a hotbed for U.S. investments. This debate seemed to 
cloud the picture of economic independence. Trudeau's 
administration felt the need for U.S. investments to create 
new jobs -- unemployment was over six percent --, but knew 
there was widespread public support for Canadian 
5The Development Corporation helped Canadian-based 
MNCs and other foreign direct investments by offering such 
services as foreign investment insurance (Niosi, 1985). 
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independence that was supposedly imperiled by U.S. 
investments. It seemed like the latter had more weight. 
When a U.S. company sought to begin a paper/pulp mill in 
Northwest Saskatchewan (a region with high unemployment) it 
was seen as a setback for Canadian economic independence. A 
Premier election in that Province was won by the candidate 
that was most opposed to U.S. investment. Other government 
shakeups were the result of a perceived need to curb 
foreign (U.S.) investments. Also, Canadians found little 
comfort in Nixon's reassurances that the U.S. had no 
intentions of making Canada a U.S. colony -- they felt 
threatened whenever the U.S. mentioned some kind of 
economic bloc pact. When U.S. companies tried to freeze 
wages in Canadian subsidiaries, angry Canadian officials 
said U.S. companies had no right to force policies on its 
subsidiaries. In Ottawa, a move was made to nationalize 
all resource industries (though the government did reject 
the proposals). In Ontario, Premier William G. Davis' 
government was said to be nationalistic and, indeed, did 
begin giving tax breaks to Canadian firms. These fears 
soon spread to concerns over U.S. dominance in Canadian 
education and communications. 6 To a certain extent, even 
Canadians working in the U.S. were viewed by their fellow 
citizens as turncoats. A surcharge on Canadian firms' 
6see McPhail (1987) for an explanation of Canada's 
media being an example of developing journalism due to the 
presence of the U.S. (esp. pg. 24-32). 
exports to the U.S. was considered a deplorable tactic for 
decreasing pressure on U.S. companies who wanted to invest 
in Canada. This had the obvious effect of more anti-u.s. 
sentiments. There was one area of agreement between some 
citizens of Canada and the U.S.: Disapproval of Vietnam. 
New Democratic Party members in Ottawa put on a 
demonstration to show their support for U.S. antiwar 
protesters. Still, this show of solidarity seemed to do 
little for the overall public sentiment in regard to the 
U.S. 
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Even with the continued feelings of anxiety toward 
U.S. investments, some Canadian officials began fearing 
Canada's anti-U.S. policies. At least half of the Premiers 
noted that Canada could not become self-sufficient and 
needed U.S. financial support. The Niagara Institute for 
International Studies was also formed to develop a better 
understanding of u.s.-canada relations in hope of quelling 
some of the fears. Trudeau even called on Nixon to help 
Canada get out from under U.S. influence, though both said 
they would continue to work on close ties between the two 
countries. 
The two sides to this issue seemed to make Trudeau 
schizophrenic when it came to U.S. relations, though his 
Liberal Party was seen as pushing for more economic 
nationalism. Some saw Trudeau as more nationalistic than 
his immediate predecessor -- L.B. Pearson. In regards to 
the Development Corporation, Trudeau felt it was imperative 
that this organization get up and running to curb U.S. 
56 
investments. He then turned around and said the two 
countries must work for closer ties. When Nixon made it 
public that he was going to visit Peking, Trudeau said that 
he was always one step ahead of Nixon; this was after he 
had asked Nixon to help Canada get out from under U.S. 
influence. The two leaders exchanged visits during the 
year, and the governments signed an extradition treaty on 
assailants of diplomats. When it came to U.S. relations 
(especially in the area of investments), Canadians were 
beginning to get a mixed signal from their Prime Minister. 
Other foreign policy was more clear. Though early in 
the year China said it was not ready to buy American 
imports, the two countries did exchange ambassadors before 
year's end. Relations with the U.S.S.R. also continued, as 
Trudeau made a visit to the u.s.S.R., and entertained 
Soviet Premier Aleksei Nikolayevich, who was thought to be 
hoping to show that Canada could have other friends in the 
global community (besides the U.S.). Though Nikolayevich 
was met with protesters in parts of Canada (over the 
U.S.S.R.'s human rights record), Canada and the u.s.s.R. 
signed an amity pact, and agreed to industrial cooperation. 
These moves were seen as both positive and detrimental for 
Canada-u.s. relations. Some felt that it was yet another 
sign of Canadian independence, while others feared it would 
split the two countries with Trudeau spending too much time 
courting the U.S.S.R. Trudeau disagreed with these latter 
sentiments. Plus, after a European-owned bank opened its 
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doors for business, Canadians saw signs of extended 
European ties, easing fears of a total turn to the u.s.s.R. 
Military Activities 
Canada did not engage in any type of warfare during 
the three years under study, though she did continue her 
membership in NATO and participated in joint military 
activities with the U.S. This included a Distant Early 
Warning Line, an affirmation that the defense of North 
America was the second highest mission of Canada's Armed 
Forces, and drills involving joint bomber runs over 
Canadian air space. The use of Canadian air space, though, 
was also an area of contention. The U.S. wanted to have 
access to Canadian air space for its anti-ballistic 
missiles, but was turned down and told by Defense Minister 
Donald s. MacDonald that Canada would link with the U.S. in 
all military concerns, except in an antiballistic missile 
system. 7 
The U.S. was eager to use Canada's North Bay military 
base as an alternate air defense base, but this request was 
denied as well. The U.S. also berated Canada for not 
carrying more of the financial load of protecting North 
America after it cut military spending in 1969. Canada, 
partly in response to the U.S. asking it to share more the 
burden of North American military defense, increased its 
7Just ten years earlier (1961), sixty-one percent of 
Canadians believed Canada's military should be equipped 
with nuclear weapons (Gallup, 1972). 
military budget in 1971 by $18 million, though the U.S. 
complained that this was still not enough. Canadian 
officials said there were better ways to spend money. 
Labor -- Strikes and Unemployment 
Rising inflation between 1969 and 1971 had many 
Canadian workers worried about their futures. Inflation 
was not the only factor blamed on rising unemployment --
u. s. investment was carrying part of the blame as well, 
with U.S.-owned companies being accused of downsizing and 
as fronts for U.S. exports to Canada. 
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Trudeau's foreign investment policies have already 
been reported, so I now turn to his anti-inflationary 
policies, which directly affected workers. Trudeau decided 
the best way to def eat inflation was to enact a voluntary 
wage freeze, which labor leaders and workers contested. 
These policies were expected to have a large impact on the 
1972 elections, while inflation and unemployment continued 
to rise (though unemployment did level off somewhat in 
1971). 
The worries over inflation and unemployment also 
caused worker unrest during the three years under 
investigation. over 500 strikes were reported each year 
(see TABLE VI, page 59), including a Ford Canada walkout in 
1969 (to respect other United Auto Worker picket lines), 
and another strike in 1971 over wages and other benefits. 8 
8unfortunately, Marton did not include this as part of 
her study of Ford Canada workers. This is the kind of 
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Air Canada workers -- who are government employees -- also 
struck in 1969. In addition, Quebec was a breeding ground 
for worker unrest, mainly due to the separatist activies in 
that Province. I now turn to these activities. 
Quebec 
Though Quebec itself played no larger role in foreign 
relations/investment than did other Canadian Provinces, the 
separatist activities there were a major part of the 
Canadian social and political landscape during the years 
under consideration. Strikes and political activies in 
1969 were the harbingers of more extreme activities in 
1970. These activities may have been exacerbated when 
France's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs turned down 
an invitation to visit Ottawa after a trip to Quebec. 
By 1970, some of the more extreme separatists had 
resorted to the kidnapping and murdering of government 
officials. Trudeau, in retaliation to these offenses, 
evoked emergency wartime powers. U.S. and French officials 
praised him for his actions, though some Canadians 
criticized him for using too much force too quickly. 
Extremist activities in Quebec had died down by 1971, 
though rising unemployment was the cause for some worker 
unrest in the region. Many Canadians were still uncertain 
of Quebec's future. It seemed that the Canadian and French 
oversight that needs to be corrected in social science 
studies, as people's attitudes are treated as if they were 
formed in a vacuum instead of a society. 
governments had come closer to seeing eye-to-eye on the 
importance of maintaining a united Canada. By mid-1971, 
Trudeau and the rest of Canada seemed to have brought 
Quebec back into Canadian line. 
Quantitative Data 
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9source: World Bank Atlas, 1969-1973. GNP and GNP 
per capita figues for all countries are not adjusted for 
inflation, but are in absolute (current) figures. 
10The GNP for 1967-1969 were estimated by using 
population and GNP per capita. 
11source, Kearl (1993) 
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TABLE VI 













Hypotheses. Predictions, and Data for Canadian Workers 
I turn now to the supporting hypotheses that I stated 
would predict the outcome of workers' attitudes toward 
foreign-owned MNCs. 
• The first would be that if national leaders 
expressed positive attitudes toward foreign investment 
and/or intervention, then workers would also show positive 
attitudes. The case here is not absolutely clear, since 
Canada began diplomatic talks with Peking during the time 
under study, courted the u.s.s.R., and stated that more 
needed to be done in relations with other regions of the 
world, such as Latin America and other Asian countries. 
What is clear is the anti-u.s. views of the national 
leaders. Since a large majority of Canada's foreign 
investment was from the U.S., it is safe to say that a 
majority of Canada's foreign investment was viewed as 
negative by national leaders, and, therefore, workers would 
be predicted to have negative attitudes toward foreign-
owned MNCs. 
12source, Leacy (1983). 
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• The second hypothesis was that any military 
intervention (inward or outward) would lead workers to 
espouse negative attitudes. Since Canada's military was, 
for the most part, inactive, except in joint practices with 
the U.S. and in quelling some of the unrest in Quebec, 
workers would not be affected by military activity in 
regards to national or international feelings. 
• The third supporting hypothesis stated that if 
strike (or worker unrest) activities were high, then 
workers would have negative attitudes toward foreign-owned 
MNCs. Canadian strike activity was high each year of the 
study, with over 500 strikes taking place each year. Ford 
Canada workers were involved in strikes in two of the years 
(1969 and 1971). This would give reason to believe, 
according to this hypothesis, that the workers questioned 
would have negative attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs. 
• My fourth and fifth supporting hypotheses concerned 
GNP and GNP per capita. The former stated that if GNP was 
rising, then workers would have positive attitudes toward 
foreign-owned MNCs. The latter stated that if GNP per 
capita were shrinking or not rising as fast as GNP, then 
workers would have negative attitudes. GNP and GNP per 
capita did rise each year, though GNP rose faster than GNP 
per capita. Thus, though GNP was growing (creating a 
stronger economy) workers were not enjoying the same 
percentage of growth in their incomes. Therefore, workers 
would be envisioned to have negative attitudes, though this 
would be tempered by the rise in both economic indicators. 
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The sixth hypothesis stated that if the country in 
question experienced high unemployment (~ 6%), then workers 
would have positive attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs. 
Since Canada experienced high unemployment only one of the 
years (1971), workers would not be predicted to have strong 
positive attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs, though the 
last year of high unemployment may have moved some workers 
to be grateful for the work. 
A combination of the six supporting hypotheses 
predicts negative attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs. 
None of the conditions documented gave workers reason to 
have positive attitudes, though circumstances relevant to 
the second and sixth hypothesis were neutral. From a 
social identity theory perspective, Canadian workers would 
view MNCs as negative if they are non-economic persons. 
This is the result that was obtained from the actual 
questionnaires (which was administered by Marton at the 
Ford plant. 13 TABLE VII (page 64) shows the percentage of 
responses to a question concerning the overall attitudes of 
the workers. 14 
13The number of workers who participated in the 
Canadian study was 100. 
14The actual question was: "What is the overall 
effect on Canada of the activities of foreign companies in 
Canada?" (Marton, 1982, pg. 85). Responses were 
operationalized on a seven-point Likert-type scale, with 
possible responses ranging from bad (1) to good (7). 
Fifty-six percent of the workers had negative 
attitudes toward MNCs, while only thirty-one percent had 
positive attitudes. Thirteen percent were noncommittal. 
TABLE VII 
WORKERS' OVERALL EVALUATION OF MNCS IN CANADA15 
Rating % of respondents 
1 (bad) 39 
2 12 
3 5 
4 (neutral) 13 
5 20 
6 6 
7 (good) 5 
To analyze the variation in overall attitudes among the 
workers, it was regressed on nine evaluative beliefs: 
MNCs' 1) influence on Canadians way of life (X1 ) , 2) 
working conditions (X2), 3) wages (X3), 4) recognition of 
unions (X4), 5) effect on Canada's economy (X5), 6) future 
effects (X6), 7) involvement in national affairs (X7 ), 8) 
acting contrary to Canadian interests (X8 ), and 9) moneys 
other than wages (X9 ).
16 
By forming a multiple regression analysis of all nine 
beliefs, the following unstandardized regression equation 
was produced: o = -.85 + .2sx1 + .25X2 + .06X3 + .17X4 + 
.35X5 + .18X6 + .20X7 + .05X8 + .42X9 , 
15source for all the tables for the Canadian workers 
are from Marton, 1982. 
16Respondents answered each question on a seven-point 
Likert scale (as in the "overall responses"). 
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where o is the overall attitude of the workers. 
This equation produced a multiple correlation 
coefficient with overall attitudes toward foreign 
investment of .85, so R2 = .7225. This equation, though, 
had intercorrelated variables, and after computing t-values 
for the betas, Marton found that only three were 
significant at the .05 level -- x1 , x5 , and x9 , with x1 
explaining the most variance (R2 for this variable was .60 
in a stepwise regression analysis). 17 
Since x1 -- MNC influence on way of life -- explained 
sixty percent of the variation between respondents, it 
would seem that a powerful case could be made that there is 
a strong relationship between nationalism and attitudes 
toward foreign-owned MNCs. But are Ford Canada workers 
more nationalistic than their fellow Canadians? In a 
survey conducted the same year as the Ford Canadian study, 
5000 Canadians were asked if they harbored negative 
attitudes toward U.S. investments. Only thirty-nine 
percent (1970 respondents) were outright negative. 18 This 
is a large difference, and suggests a exacerbation effect 
17standardizing the betas may have given us even more 
insight into the effects of each of the beliefs, but this 
was not included in Marten's study (nor was the information 
needed to perform the calculations, so the results could 
not be checked). The t-values, though, do give us an 
estimate of what linear relations may be found in the 
population (assuming this was all Canadian workers in 
"blue-collar" positions within foreign-owned MNCs). 
18rf a chi-square test of independence were conducted 
using the two groups, the significance level would be above 
ninety-nine percent. 
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of working within a foreign-owned MNC. (This is not to say 
that causation has been found in either direction, but to 
point out the strong relationship between nationalism and 
negative attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs. 19 ) I turn 
now to Brazil to find out if workers employed within 
foreign-owned MNCs there had the same attitudes toward 
their employers as did the Canadian workers. 
BRAZIL 
General History 
Brazil proclaimed its independence from Portugal in 
1822, and has struggled to shake the effects of its 
colonial past ever since. This has not been easy. Though 
Brazil boasts the largest land area and population of any 
country in South America, which means both large raw 
material deposits and an ample supply of labor power, it 
has not been able to develop without the help of foreign 
investment. This has usually come in the form of 
19A linear relation between nationalism and employment 
within MNCs (or any other variable) becomes even more 
problematic when nationalism is studied across age and 
temporal boundaries. In a survey involving Canadian high 
school students conducted in 1968, over 60 percent of the 
respondents said that U.S. interests hold too much control 
over Canadian resources (Forbes, 1985), but another study 
done around 1964 found a nearly unanimous acceptance of 
U.S. investments among English-speaking Canadian college 
students (Clark, 1965). Social identification theory 
approaches these different intensities of nationalism by 
searching for positive self identification factors, which 
makes linear relations less problematic. (In other words, 
the intensity of nationalism starts within the person or 
group based on societal factors; see Chapter VI below for a 
further explanation.) 
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investments by MNCs (mostly from the U.S., though in no way 
has it been confined only to the U.S.) (Horowitz, 1964). 
In 1960, Brazil became a member of the Latin American 
Free Trade Association (LAFTA). As with most integrated 
trade pacts, LAFTA was formed with a desire to strengthen 
the individual nations' economic situations. Shortly after 
LAFTA was formed, Brazil emerged as the economic leader, 
which led to small rivalries with some of the other nations 
involved, such as Argentina and Chile. This continued into 
the '70s as will be seen shortly (Jones, 1991). In spite 
of these small rivalries, LAFTA stayed intact. 
Though LAFTA had some success in helping Brazil's 
economy grow, it took a military coup in 1964 to make it 
really expand. The coup was brought about by high 
inflation, which in turn caused worker strikes and riots. 
This unstable situation may have caused U.S. investors in 
Brazil to help finance the coup, as the U.S. Navy 
dispatched ships to back the coup. The ships never made it 
that far, as the coup was successfully completed within a 
couple of days (Shoumatoff, 1980). 
Before and after the coup, the U.S. had been the 
largest foreign investor in Brazil (and this has 
continued). According to Horowitz (1964), this made the 
U.S. a scapegoat for Brazilian nationalists. Even though 
U.S. companies were undoubtedly the best taxpayers, as well 
as the best wage payers in Brazil, this had not made them 
any more welcome. As a matter of fact, an ex-President of 
Brazil, Janio Quardos, wrote that Brazil must get out from 
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under U.S. control (Horowitz, 1964). All of this was 
written before 1964. The Brazilian workers involved in the 
study were questioned in 1974. How many, if any, changes 
occurred during those ten years? 
Before I outline the events in Brazil from 1972 
through 1974, it should be noted that many outside of 
Brazil felt that it was the perfect country for foreign 
direct investment. LaPalombara and Blank (1984) even named 
a model for foreign investment the "Brazilian model," 
commenting that other countries could learn from what 
Brazil had done. They pointed out that a major reason for 
this success was the military regime and the amount of 
governmental support for already existing MNCs. Others 
hailed Brazil's economic growth in the early and mid 1970's 
as an economic miracle, as its GNP rapidly increased 
throughout these years (Brockway, 1993, Larrain, 1989). It 
was only after the mid 70's that social scientists 
recognized that, as with most developing countries, this 
success was achieved at the expense of the bottom half of 
the nation's population (actually more than half, as more 
Brazilians were below the average income than above). The 
gap between rich and poor was widening at the same rate the 
GNP was rising (Maxcy, 1981). 
Politics 
Nineteen-hundred-seventy-two marked the 150th 
anniversary of Brazilian independence. Many celebrations 
were planned and carried out with the hope of stirring 
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public pride in Brazil. While this may be interpreted as a 
showing of nationalistic pride, Brazil's economic growth at 
this time was, in fact, fueled by foreign investment. 
Brazil entered 1972 coming off the best year in its 
economic history with an increase in GNP of eleven percent. 
This was helped by several billion dollars of both domestic 
and foreign investment. To continue this growth, Brazilian 
officials decided to continue to invite foreign companies 
to begin operations in Brazil. This was not only for 
continued economic strength, but also as a source of jobs. 
Even though pollution caused by such companies (many were 
natural resource ventures such as paper/pulp mills and 
mining extractors) was the cause for some concern, high-
ranking Brazilian officials felt that this was not a worry 
at the time, and when it did become a problem the rich 
industrial countries would clean it up -- since they were 
the ones that caused it (through their subsidiaries). 
Though the U.S. was the major foreign investor in 
Brazil in 1972, 20 and even sent a group of officials to 
study Brazil's economic growth, other countries saw this 
South American country as a target for investments as well. 
Japan set up a paper/pulp mill in Brazil during 1972, and 
sent a national mission there to investigate investment 
opportunities and economic cooperation between the two 
20u.s. companies saw Brazil as a good place to set up 
operations as they fought high wages and stringent 
pollution controls at home. 
countries. Japan had close to 700,000 expatriates in 
Brazil in 1972. In all, it was estimated that over one 
billion dollars of new foreign investment and bank loans 
entered Brazil in 1972. 21 
Brazil was also looking outward at this time. The 
Brazilian government put pressure on foreign-owned MNCs to 
look for new markets for export goods. The Brazilian 
leaders said this was the price to pay for continued 
incentives given to MNCs. Africa was even courted as a 
possible partner for economic cooperation, as were Latin 
America countries. Brazilian President Emilio Garrastazu 
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Medici signed a law creating new Brazilian trading 
companies based on the Japanese model. The companies were 
to be Brazilian owned, though foreign partners were free to 
join as long as majority ownership was Brazilian. 
Many within and outside of Brazil saw these 
proceedings as Brazil's move to become the leader of the 
Third World. There were critics, however. The Roman 
Catholic Church and the Government feuded over the 
treatment of native populations, as The Church accused the 
government of displacing these people by allowing MNCs to 
expand into Brazil's rain forests. Others saw Brazil's 
21Both the U.S. and Japan sent loans to Brazil in 
1972. The U.S. Export-Import Bank announced two one 
million dollar loans so Brazilians could ~urchase U.S. 
goods and services in heavy machinery, while Japan issued 
over $32 million dollars worth of bonds on behalf of the 
Brazilian government during the year {it should be noted 
that this did come after suspension of 3 Brazilian bonds on 
the New York Stock Exchange). 
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economic growth as a way to continue low wages and military 
oppression. When Amnesty International made claims of 
torture against the Brazilian government, the u.s. 
threatened to end military aid. 22 Further, many in the 
Latin American community pushed for Brazil to end its Cuban 
Boycott and increase trade with the U.S.S.R. This latter 
development may have been hindered when possible u.s.s.R. 
informants were arrested for subversion against the 
Brazilian government. Finally, in an act that was seen as 
a move to strain British-Brazilian ties, a British sailor 
on shore leave in Sao Paulo was attacked and killed by 
rebel guerrillas. It did little good. 
Brazilian officials continued to encourage FDI in 
1973, as Brazil continued its quest to become a developed 
nation. Though many in Brazil hoped to do this with less 
dependence on FD! (true economic progress was seen to be 
linked to national pride), others in Brazil looked to 
Japan, Europe, and the U.S. for continued support. Japan 
was held as a model of economic achievement given its fall 
and rise after WWII. MNCs from other countries seemed to 
be more than happy to continue to take advantage of 
Brazil's raw materials and large (cheap) labor force. 
Foreign relations with the U.S. were apparently not 
hindered by the threat of withdraw of military aid made in 
22This may have been of little concern at the time, as 
$59 million worth of air traffic control and air defense 
radar systems had been purchased from the French in 1972. 
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1972. As a matter of fact, the U.S. sent jet fighters to 
Brazil to help in military matters. U.S. President Richard 
Nixon noted that Brazil was the natural leader for Latin 
America and began building new ties with Brazil. There 
was, however, one small problem with relations between the 
two countries that occurred over the sale of real estate. 
A deal that was to involve the U.S. selling an old embassy 
building to West Germany was vetoed by the Brazilian 
government. The sale was seen as a tax evasion measure on 
the part of the U.S. participants. This may have caused a 
small rift in U.S.-Brazilian ties, but one would have to 
wonder how much it would have affected the general public, 
especially since nothing more came of it (no threats to 
invade Brazil or pull all aid from that country). 
While U.S. relations continued to be mostly friendly 
through 1973 and Brazil continued to look to other 
developed countries as a way to continue its economic 
progress, relations with other Latin American countries 
were deteriorating. After Nixon's statement regarding 
Brazil's leadership potentials, relations with Argentina 
began to cool. Other Latin American countries saw Brazil 
as becoming imperialistic, especially towards its closest 
neighbors. Brazilian officials shot back with statements 
that it was being used as a scapegoat for the problems 
experienced in these other Latin American countries. 
Relations with some other countries were also becoming 
problematic. Japan became the target for some government 
concern. Fears of pollution and natural resource depletion 
caused the Brazilian government to insist that a new 
Japanese factory use the most advanced pollution control 
devices in the construction of the plant. Though this did 
not move the Japanese to withdraw from Brazil, it can be 
seen as a move towards more control over FDI. It was also 
feared that boycotts by Arabs, or any cutbacks in energy 
supplies from them, would trigger a halt to Brazil's 
economic growth. The National Monetary Council of Brazil 
ordered a forty percent reduction in the foreign exchange 
reserves held in Brazilian banks (estimated to be at $6.4 
billion U.S. dollars). These funds were seen as having 
adverse affects on inflation. 
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Though Brazil experienced the largest gain in GNP 
(eleven percent) of any major nation in 1973, it did begin 
to experience an economic slowdown toward the end of 1973 
and the beginning of 1974 (a trend that was to continue). 
This slowdown was blamed mainly on a balance of payment 
problem stemming from dependence on imported oil. 23 
Brazilian officials (led by newly selected President 
General Ernesto Geisel) began courting Arab investments, 
hoping to lower the balance of payment debt and ensure that 
no boycotts within this sector would happen. Arab bankers 
and industrialists took this opportunity to look seriously 
into investing in Brazil. Some inside and outside Brazil 
were beginning to question Geisel's open arms policy, much 
23Approximately eighty percent of Brazil's oil was 
being imported at this time. 
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of this criticism stemming from a growing concern over the 
environment. 
Brazil's foreign relations under Geisel seemed to 
become somewhat more disorganized, though many still saw 
Brazil as having the potential of becoming a world power. 
U.S. relations continued to be strong for the most part, 24 
as First Lady Pat Nixon was a guest at Geisel's 
inauguration, and Brazil looked towards U.S. investments as 
a possible solution to its growing economic problems. 
There was some worry over trade barriers between the two 
countries, especially after Brazilian officials accused the 
U.S. of trying to place import duties on Brazilian shoes. 
Nixon sent a top advisor to Brazil to iron out the 
differences. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger seemed to 
have done little to promote relations. He was given a 
lukewarm warm welcome when he visited Brazil later in the 
year. (This was mainly due to Kissinger's public backing 
of the Netherlands' soccer team during a Netherlands-Brazil 
soccer contest the preceeding year.) 
24There were two isolated incidents involving U.S. 
citizens in Brazil that could have hindered ties. A U.S. 
journalist was arrested after interviewing outgoing 
Brazilian President Juan Domingo Peron. This arrest was 
based on charges of incriminated evidence of the ruling 
military party -- evidence that had reportedly been made up 
by the journalist. The second incident involved a U.S. 
businessman who was arrested and supposedly tortured over 
charges of stealing monies. Though U.S. officials demanded 
humane treatment from Brazilian officials, the incidents 
seemed to have had little impact on ties between the 
countries. 
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Brazil was still seen as an up and coming power in 
Latin America, especially by Argentina. Geisel and his 
officials continually denied these charges, saying Brazil 
was not out for power, but trying to develop economically. 
Nevertheless, Argentinean officials continued to be 
outspoken critics of Brazil. Paraguay and Bolivia were 
pursued in the hopes of establishing economic ties. Brazil 
and Bolivia even signed an economic cooperation pact, and 
Geisel used this as a start towards Latin American 
solidarity and integration. He was met with student 
protests in Bolivia shortly after the pact was signed. 
These students were concerned about Brazil's perceived 
power and militaristic government. 
Brazil established ties with Communist China in 1974, 
though, as with Canada's ties with Communist China, this 
came at the cost of losing diplomatic ties with Taiwan. 
With ties to Peking, Brazil was hoping to buy Chinese coal, 
chemical products, and oil. Though it was not explicitly 
mentioned, it was a move to reduce her reliance on Middle 
East oil. Also, Brazil pursued possible joint ventures 
with the Chinese in steel production. In addition, other 
communist countries, such as the u.s.s.R., were approached, 
though no such breakthrough was made with Cuba. Arabs were 
looking into investments in Brazil as well, though progress 
here was tied to Brazilian officials' willingness to back 
the Arabs' conflict with Israel. In an international 
development, Brazil sent a contingent to fight for the 
right to continue population growth at the U.N. World 
Population Conference -- this was the opposite stance from 
most other Third World countries, a move that could be 
viewed as nationalistic. 
Military Activities 
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Military operations during the period under study were 
mainly limited to fighting anti-government guerrillas. 
Very few military regimes in the Third World are safe from 
guerrilla actions aimed at overthrowing the current regime. 
Though this action was small in 1972, it was to pick up 
later. 
Military activity involving Brazilian forces continued 
to be focused internally in 1973 and 1974. Though the 
Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (the largest Brazilian 
guerrilla organization) was disbanded early in 1973, 
guerrilla forces continued to plague the military, and at 
one point these groups threatened to kidnap the daughter of 
U.S. Vice President Sipro Agnew. The only other major 
military activity was that of the U.S. jets being sent to 
Brazil (mentioned above). This purchase (and other 
purchases of U.S. weapons) were seen by some within Brazil 
as a way to continue to oppress the people. 
When Geisel entered the Presidency in 1974, he 
promised a relaxation of military censorship over the 
media, though this did not last long. He also made it 
known that the military was his number one priority. 
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Labor -- Strikes and Unemployment 
Worker unrest and strikes were a factor in the 
national landscape, though militant unions and strikes were 
illegal during the period under discussion. There is no 
quantifiable data for strikes during this time. Several 
work stoppages were reported, though the reports were 
censored. Reports of such work stoppages did point out 
that most took place in the modern sector, a sector heavily 
saturated with foreign-owned MNCs, including pulp and paper 
mills -- the industry used to gather data for Brazil 
(Sandoval, 1993). 25 
The Roman catholic Church played a major role in the 
worker uprisings. The Church continually accused the 
government of perpetuating low wages and poor living 
conditions for much of the population. They even said that 
workers were ready to physically confront the government if 
necessary. 
Quantitative Data 
TABLES VIII, and IX and contain the quantitative data 
for Brazil (page 78). 
25To give an idea of the political landscape of Brazil 
during the years under investigation, in 1972, 18 deaths 
were reported alon9 with four disappearances; 1973, 16 
deaths and seven disappearances; 1974, O deaths, 13 
disappearances (Sandoval, 1993). 
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TABLE VIII 
GNP AND GNP PER CAPITA, BRAZIL 1970-197426 
Year GNP(millions U.S.$) GNP per capita(U.S.$) 
1970 38,470 420 
1971 44,260 460 
1972 52,010 530 
1973 76,950 760 
1974 97,250 940 
TABLE IX 
UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES, BRAZIL 1970-197427 
Year Population # of unemployed (x 1000) 
1970 92,237,570 725.0 
1971 95,170,000 723.0 
1972 97,850,000 1,033.9 
1973 100,560,000 968.0 
1974 
Hypotheses. Predictions and Data for Brazilian Workers 
I turn now to the supporting hypotheses. 
• The first, that if national leaders express 
positive attitudes toward foreign investment and/or 
intervention, then workers will show positive attitudes 
toward foreign-owned MNCs, would predict positive 
attitudes. Brazilian leaders between 1972 and 1974 were 
heavily in favor of foreign-owned MNCs, seeing these 
organizations as essential to continued economic growth. 
26source, World Bank Atlas, 1972-1976. 
27source, Wilkie (1980). Brazil did not report 
unemployment rates during these years, though from 1970 to 
1973 the number of unemployed workers was reported. For 
this reason, I will give population and unemployed figures 
for each of these years. No figures were reported for 
1974. 
The sentiment of U.S. domination expressed by Horowitz 
seems to either have been reified or dissipated within the 
ten years between his writings and the time under study. 
Also, other countries were openly courted for economic 
reasons. 
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• The second supporting hypothesis, that if the 
country were experiencing either inward or outward military 
intervention, then workers would have negative attitudes 
toward foreign-owned MNCs, would show that there was little 
activity (that involved another country) in this area for 
workers to be concerned. 
• The third supporting hypothesis is blurred in this 
case. If a country experienced over 200 strikes during any 
of the years under study, then workers would view foreign-
owned MNCs as negative. Unfortunately, strikes were 
illegal, and worker unrest and strikes during this time 
were not reported. It is probably safe to say that in no 
year were there 200 strikes, but this may not be due to 
worker satisfaction, but due to the legality of strikes. 
It would seem that workers were not too unhappy, since 
there were no major worker riots during this time, but this 
cannot be backed by fact. 
• The fourth supporting hypothesis, that if GNP was 
rising, then workers would have positive attitudes toward 
foreign-owned MNCs, anticipates positive attitudes within 
the working class. GNP grew each year by over ten percent. 
Plus, Brazil was praised as having the highest rise in GNP 
of any major nation in 1973 (reported in 1974). 
• The fifth supporting hypothesis, that if GNP per 
capital was shrinking or not growing as fast as GNP, then 
workers would have negative attitudes toward foreign-owned 
MNCs. As can be seen, GNP per capita was not growing as 
fast as GNP, though it was not too far behind. Based on 
this, workers would be predicted to have negative 
attitudes, though they would not be extreme. 
80 
• The sixth supporting hypothesis states that if 
unemployment rates are high, then workers will have 
positive attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs. Though 
unemployment statistics for Brazil (and any developing 
country) are suspect, it is true that unemployment was high 
during the time under investigation (and continues to be 
so). Since foreign-owned MNCs were offering employment in 
an environment of high unemployment, workers would be 
envisioned to have positive attitudes toward foreign-owned 
MNCs. 
By combining the above hypotheses (leaving out the 
third), it would appear that workers in Brazil would 
espouse positive attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs. This 
is what was found by Blake and Driscoll (1982). They asked 
Brazilians who were directly and indirectly employed by two 
u.s.-owned paper/pulp mills28 , as well as other Brazilian 
nationals, about the impact of the mills on the local 
communities. TABLE X (page 81) contains their findings. 
28The two mills were owned by Olinkraft and Westvaco. 
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TABLE X 
ATTITUDES TOWARD COMMUNITY IMPACT OF TWO U.S. 
PAPER/PULP MILLS OPERATING IN BRAZIL (percentage) 29 
Plant # of Respondents Very Positive Positive 
Olinkraft 119 61.4 37.5 
Westvaco 108 84.4 14.3 
Their findings leave little question as to the 
importance of these two paper/pulp mills to the Brazilian 
citizens. TABLE XI contains the percentages of respondents 
who found different aspects of the mills to have positive 
impacts on their communities when asked about the mills in 
open-ended interviews. 
TABLE XI 
POSITIVE ASPECTS OF COMPANIES' EFFECT ON COMMUNITY 
(percentage) 
Aspect Percentage of responses (n = 290) 
Employment 
Adds to community life 
Industrial development 
Taxes and other services 
Generates other business 













These findings can be compared with responses to negative 
aspects of the mills in TABLE XII (page 82). 30 
29All Tables dealing with the Brazilian workers can be 
found in Blake and Driscoll (1982). Also, percentages may 
not be equal to one hundred due to rounding. 
30The open-ended interviews asked respondents to 
discuss both positive and negative aspects of the mills. A 
majority of the respondents then had to be asked again 
TABLE XII 
NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF COMPANIES ON COMMUNITY, STATES {OF 
BRAZIL) OR BRAZIL 
Aspect Percentage of responses (n = 195) 
No harm 
Pollution 
Don't know, no answer, or neutral 
Local problems 







There can be very little doubt that there are both 
quantitative and qualitative differences between the Ford 
Canadian workers and the Brazilian paper/pulp mill workers. 
The Brazilian workers were skewed heavier to one side of 
the scale of attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs than the 
Canadian workers, i.e. there seemed to be a larger 
consensus among Brazilians in regards to foreign-owned 
MNCs. And, of course, the Brazilians were much more 
positive towards foreign-owned MNCs than the Candians. 
Does this mean that Brazilians are less nationalistic than 
Canadians? To answer this question, I need to return 
briefly to the label "nationalism." If nationalism is 
considered a type of group paranoia, as Kis (1992) seems to 
think, then the Canadian workers could be considered more 
nationalistic (more negative toward inward foreign 
investment). If nationalism is an expression of national 
pride (as in the Brazilians' support for their national 
soccer team) and well-being (no matter what the means), 
about negative aspects only, as they would only talk about 
the positive aspects. 
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then no such assumption can be made. 31 Instead, the idea 
that working for a foreign-owned MNC could exacerbate 
nationalistic feelings can again be tested with the 
Brazilian study. All categories of Brazilian respondents 
were in favor of the foreign-owned MNCs, but when attitudes 
of employees and suppliers were compared to those not 
employed (directly or indirectly) by the MNCs, the former 
were much more positive on most aspects of the MNCs (not 
all the differences were statistically significant, though 
in all cases the employees were more positive). Is there 
then a MNC effect, as the two cases presented so far 
suggests? I now turn to the third group of workers -- West 
German managers employed within MNCs, to 
see if the pattern continues. 
WEST GERMANY 
General History 
At the end of WWII, a person evaluating nationalism 
within West Germany would probably have said that Germans 
were too nationalistic and nothing would change them. This 
31It is hard to have much confidence in studies that 
show that nationalism is evenly distributed throughout 
society. In a study done in 1948, in which people were 
asked if their country held the greatest opportunity to 
pursue the "good-life," responses ranged from ninety-six 
percent in the U.S. to thirty percent in West Germany 
(Doob, 1964). Obviously these responses were tempered by 
temporal factors, yet it shows the large differences such 
abstract (though real) attitudes can take across society, 
not only in the number of people who are nationalistic, but 
the intensity of nationalism as well. 
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could have been based on the fact that Germany had been the 
aggressor in two major wars (WWI and WWII) within the past 
twenty-six years (from the beginning of WWI to the end of 
WWII), with their end goal being global domination (as well 
as racial domination in the latter war). This 
nationalistic image could be further increased by the split 
between East and West Germany, making West Germany the 
first line of defense against the Warsaw Pact countries. 32 
Though West Germany may have had many reasons to be 
nationalistic, she seems to have been trying, since the end 
of WWII, to shed her past image, as can be clearly seen in 
her Ostpolitik. 33 Shortly after WWII, West Germany's 
postwar Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, told the French 
(Germany's long-time rival) that Germany's fate was tied to 
that of Western Europe (Pfaff, 1993). West Germany was 
given back its sovereignty in 1955 (Stahl, 1963). Since 
then, West Germany has been the driving force behind the 
European Economic Community (EC). 
The rise of West Germany's economic strength can be 
tied to the U.S. Marshall Plan which helped rebuild West 
32It should be noted that this split was not brought 
about by the German people, but by the ideologies of the 
leaders of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Though West Germany 
is a member of the former and East Germany was a member of 
the latter, their roles were manipulated by other members 
of the pacts (Kennedy, 1987). This became evident when 
both Germanys celebrated the falling of the Berlin Wall. 
33ostpolitik is a policy or agenda aimed at reunifying 
the two Germanys, as well as European reconciliation in 
economic and political affairs (Jones, 1991). 
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Germany's industrial infrastructure after WWII (Stahl, 
1963). Since that time, West Germany has become one of the 
most prosperous nations in the world (Brockway, 1963), and 
the third largest producer of motor vehicles in the world 
(Maxcy, 1981). 34 
Though West Germany is (or seems to be) trying to 
shake its nationalistic reputation, it has not always been 
helped by its Western European neighbors. In the 1970's 
there was a push in West Germany to create more MNCs within 
Western Europe, but the effort was met with stiff 
resistance -- mainly in the form of nationalism and 
"Germanphobia." There were some exceptions, such as Volvo, 
but for the most part foreign-owned MNCs were seen as 
neocolonialistic (Maxcy, 1981). 
Politics 
By 1974, West Germany had the largest economy in 
Europe, along with a low unemployment rate (1.6%) (Kearl, 
1993), 35 but this was rising and workers were threatening 
nationwide strikes. West Germany also boasted a record 
trade surplus of $10.8 billion, which was helped by 2.6 
34The reason I focus on automobile manufacturing is 
that this is an industry that not only gives some idea of 
the strength of a nation, but also tends to be suited for 
multinational endeavors. If a country has a strong 
automobile sector, it is probably a strong home nation for 
MNCs. The facts seem to support this, as the U.S. is 
number one, Japan second, and West Germany third. All 
three have many home-based MNCs. 
35west Germany had the second lowest unemployment rate 
of any major country in 1974. Japan was lower at 1.4%. 
million foreign workers. West Germany was home of the 
second largest military force in NATO, and she had the 
founder of Ostpolitik, Willy Brandt, as her Chancellor 
until March. 
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West Germany was rocked by the resignation of 
Chancellor Brandt in 1974. 36 Brandt had been elected 
Chancellor in 1969. During his time in office he 
continually pushed for German reunification, a unified 
Europe (in the form of the EC), and detente with the 
u.s.s.R. and other Eastern European nations. Before he 
left office in March, Brandt backed an agreement that gave 
West German and u.s.s.R. entrepreneurs the chance to join 
forces in setting up joint companies in Third World 
countries. In spite of these events, some thought his 
efforts to build relations with the u.s.s.R. had slowed 
down by this time. Brandt felt that talks would only 
succeed if the ideological barriers between East and West 
were dropped. Brandt was also planning on increasing West 
German purchases of other EC partners' products to help 
boost their economies. He oversaw the passage of a bill 
that gave West German workers a larger voice in business (a 
move from one-third of representation on company boards to 
one-half) and a newly created government-run system of 
profit-sharing. Though workers and labor leaders hailed 
this new law, business leaders said it would be too 
36As was East Germany. 
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expensive. This concern was echoed by U.S. businesses 
operating in West Germany, which, in turn, gave West German 
governmental officials a reason to accuse these u.s. 
business leaders of meddling in West German affairs. 
Brandt's resignation was brought about, in large part, 
by an East German spy scandal that originated in Brandt's 
office. Whether a spy scandal would cause citizens to 
become more or less nationalistic is open to debate (it 
seems that this could be the basis for strong nationalism, 
as one country would see another as meddling in its affairs 
and jeopardizing its security), it did give officials of 
the u.s.s.R. a chance to issue a report that this was a 
major setback to East-West detente. Not only was the spy 
scandal a setback, but Brandt was the one Western leader 
who had forged personal ties with u.s.s.R.'s leader Leonid 
Brezhnev. 
Brandt was succeeded by his Finance Minister Helmut 
Schmidt. Schmidt was expected to be friendlier to business 
than Brandt, but many were not sure what his foreign 
relations policy would be. Shortly after entering the 
Chancellor's office, Schmidt made it clear that he would 
continue Brandt's policy of Ostpolitik. 
Relations with the U.S. were nurtured by Schmidt. He 
had visited the U.S. before becoming Chancellor, and 
traveled there again in December. He was pushing to have 
the U.S. follow West Germany's move to drop anti-
inflationary policies and focus instead on unemployment 
issues, and even welcomed u.s. investments. Schmidt sent 
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officials to Washington o.c. to discuss military issues. 
Schmidt seemed more inclined to having a strong military 
presence in West Germany than did his predecessor. Even in 
his inaugural address he made a plea for U.S. military and 
political presence in all of Europe, saying NATO was the 
heart of Europe's and West Germany's security. An 
agreement expanding cooperation in environmental matters 
was also signed between the U.S. and West Germany. The 
U.S. sent Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to West 
Germany to continue talks on economic and defense issues. 
One area of contention between the two countries arose over 
the activity of the CIA. West German officials viewed CIA 
operatives in West Germany as acting without their consent. 
When lists of spies were made known to West German 
officials, it always came after investigations had been 
done. 
Schmidt visited the U.S.S.R. within his first year as 
Chancellor, actually visiting there before traveling to the 
U.S. His talks centered around long-term economic 
cooperation and trade. With the U.S.S.R. rich in natural 
resources, such as oil, coal, and natural gas -- resources 
needed by an industrialized country -- and West Germany 
rich in technical knowledge -- something needed by the 
u.s.s.R. -- cooperation made good sense. The only problem 
was the land between the two countries. Nations within 
this area, especially East Germany, did not want power and 
transportation lines linking West Germany and the u.s.s.R. 
running across their lands. u.s.s.R. officials traveled to 
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West Germany at this time to continue talks over the 
impasse. 
Relations with France were expected to improve after 
three hundred years of animosity. One reason for this 
optimism was that both countries had new leaders. West 
Germany had Schmidt, while France had a new President, 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing. The two leaders did meet, but 
Schmidt found d'Estaing a weak leader, or at least 
mentioned that he did not have enough domestic support in 
France to help West Germany unify Europe. Relations became 
strained once again. 37 
East Germany and West Germany seemed to be locked in a 
love-hate relationship. Though they exchanged permanent 
representatives, East Germany removed all mention of German 
reunification from its Constitution. The two countries 
even bickered over the ownership of museum pieces. These 
pieces had been displayed in what became East Germany 
before WWII, but had been moved to West Germany by war's 
end. Still, from the West German point of view, the 
emphasis was on reunification. 
The final foreign relations aspect of 1974 involved 
Middle East countries. When Kuwaiti investors bought 
37This should not have come as a great surprise. 
While still Finance Minister, Schmdit was backing pressure 
from the U.S. on France to follow u.s.-generated energy 
policies within NATO. France was apprehensive, feeling 
that this would be a buckling to U.S. domination. France 
was also being overlooked for help in European unification 
during this time. Once again, the country looked to was 
the U.S. 
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fourteen percent of Daimler-Benz, West German officials and 
business leaders began calling for tighter controls over 
foreign investments. These officials knew the importance 
of Middle Eastern oil, but this very importance generated 
concern. The dependence on foreign oil had been an area of 
concern for all industrialized countries after WWII, and 
now the dollars being spent for that oil were showing back 
up as petrodollars in West German companies. Schmidt did 
say Arabian investors were welcome, but the cry for control 
over foreign investments would get louder in 1975. 
There were two internal political events (other than 
Brandt's resignation) that took place in 1974 that may have 
had an effect on nationalist attitudes. The first was the 
formation of a new right-wing political party (Union of 
Free Germany) that was to attract nationalists and other 
conservatives. Though the party opened with only about 300 
members, it was reported that another 20,000 West Germans 
had expressed an interest in joining. The second event was 
the discontinued observation of the anniversary of the June 
17, 1963 uprising of workers in East Germany. This day had 
been seen as the day of unity for the two Germanys. 
Schmidt was heavily criticized by workers and labor leaders 
for his part in this matter. 38 
38This criticism was no doubt louder based on the fact 
that Schmdit had promised to continue Brandt's 
reunification policies. 
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Relations with East Germany continued to be on 
unstable ground in 1975. Opposition leaders in the West 
German government wanted Schmidt to refuse to sign the 
closing Declaration of the European Security Conference 
because they felt it did not guarantee the right for the 
future reunification of the two Germanys. East German 
spies continued to plague West German security circles, and 
kept NATO officials uneasy. 39 Schmidt, meanwhile, 
continued to emphasize the need for strengthening relations 
with East Germany (and other Eastern European countries), 
saying it was fundamental to West German foreign policy. 
Middle East investors continued to concern West German 
officials as money continued to pour in from Kuwaiti and 
Iran. Bills were proposed to curb such investments 
(especially in sensitive sectors), though these bills were 
written so as to not affect investments originating in OECD 
member countries. 40 This Middle East xenophobia was 
certainly evident when a six man Saudi Arabian delegation 
caused a stir during a West German business conference. 41 
Saudi Arabians were also buying West German castles, which 
39A West German Air Force colonel was arrested for 
spying for East Germany, and even Willy Brandt's son was 
held for questioning. 
40schmidt went so far as to say that all major western 
nations, including the U.S., were worried about Middle 
Eastern investments. 
41The delegation was not asked to leave, but West 




caused alarm in some circles. Schmidt did meet with the 
Shah of Iran -- a sign that some in West Germany felt the 
need to keep some semblance of diplomatic ties with these 
countries. 
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West German officials were becoming concerned with 
their u.s.S.R. detente policy, saying that it was beginning 
to slow, though it continued to be stable. When the U.S. 
and u.s.s.R. broke off a trade agreement, West German 
officials were reported to be uneasy, but confident that 
their position would be safe. West German President Walter 
Scheel did meet with Brezhnev to discuss exchanges of 
technical and intellectual information, though little 
progress was made. These talks did little to solve the 
continued debate over the border of West Berlin. Voters 
were also expressing their discontent over recent relations 
with the U.S.S.R. Some elections were lost over this 
issue, as West Germans began demanding (with their paper 
stones) a stronger stance with the U.S.S.R., especially 
concerning West Berlin. Though voters may have wanted a 
harder line, some German officials felt otherwise. In a 
move that some may have considered much too friendly, 
military leaders in the u.s.s.R. were offered invitations 
to observe West German military maneuvers. 
One country that West Germany continued to turn to was 
the U.S. During the year, Kissinger met with Schmidt to 
discuss economic issues (shortly after the two countries 
and Japan pulled together to ward off pressure from the 
International Monetary Fund to stimulate their economies), 
Scheel met with Ford to discuss defense issues, and Ford 
met with Schmidt to coordinate efforts concerning Western 
Europe's economic programs. U.S. business leaders did 
cause some waves. Henry Ford II, during a visit to Ford 
facilities in West Germany, lashed out at the 
codetermination bill saying it would be bad for business, 
but the bill still passed. Lockheed was accused of paying 
off West German officials to promote the sales of its U.S. 
manufactured aircraft. In addition, an agreement to sell 
nuclear technology to Brazil was met with stiff resistance 
(Braunthal, 1977). Still, with the many meetings of top 
officials42 and the presence of U.S. troops in West 
Germany, u.s.--West Germany relations were strong. 
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In other foreign relations, ties with France did 
stabilize (for a short time), as Schmidt met again with 
d'Estaing and agreed on a coordinated economic program. 
France even ended celebrations commemorating its victory 
over Germany in WWII. Meanwhile, ties with Poland became 
strained after Polish officials demanded reparations from 
West Germany. Relations with Spain were also put under 
pressure after Schmidt sought to block the entrance of 
Spain into NATO, saying it would be too much of an economic 
burden. China was courted, as Schmidt became the first 
West German official to visit that country. He signed an 
42Not only did the aforementioned meetings take place, 
but Brandt also made a North American visit, stopping in 
Mexico and the U.S. 
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agreement after talks with Mao Tse-tung to establish a 
joint trade commission. Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin made 
a visit to West Germany to discuss issues in his country in 
which West Germany could have played a part. 
Internal politics and activities kept West German 
leaders busy as they approached a major election year. 
Over one million workers were unemployed, and a trade 
surplus of $22 billion began to fall. Schmidt did try to 
appease workers by saying they were the reason behind West 
Germany's success as a European and world power. Plus, 
Schmidt was being plagued by terrorist activities, as the 
West German embassy in Stockholm was stormed. This was in 
retaliation to the holding of terrorists in West German 
prisons. 
Nineteen-hundred-seventy-six was a major election year 
in West Germany. Schmidt was facing growing opposition 
from Helmut Kohl and the conservatives. Though he won the 
election, his margin of victory was very slight (two House 
votes). During the campaign, Schmidt took every 
opportunity to win the loyalties of the West German 
workers, though he did refuse to nationalize West German 
industry (Braunthal, 1977). Unemployment did drop, though 
this was still seen as a major problem during Schmidt's 
term. The codetermination law went into effect on July 1 
(the elections were in October) which improved Schmidt's 
position with the workers, but others in the business 
sector felt that backlashes were inevitable as power was 
given to the wrong people. In addition, Schmidt said that 
,,,· 
' 
humane working conditions were key to social peace and 
stability. Still, the narrow victory showed that not all 
were won over by Schmidt. 43 This election also showed a 
rejuvenation of neo-Nazis, who received 120,000 votes 
(Braunthal, 1977.). 
In foreign relations, West Germany found itself once 
again being accused of interfering with its own economic 
growth. European neighbors and the IMF began putting 
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pressure on West Germany to boost its economy. In Paris, 
Amsterdam, and Stockholm people were found to still harbor 
fears of Germany stemming from WWII, West Germany's growing 
economic base, and its growing military. The opposition 
party (Christian Democrats) held Schmidt accountable for 
these attitudes, pointing to his continuing assertion that 
West Germany was the leading country in Western Europe. 44 
He did make statements that he was putting West Germany in 
a position to help other nations with their balance of 
payment problems. 
Relations with the U.S. continued to be strong, with 
Schmidt saying that relations had developed to the point of 
being based on mutual trust. His unemployment policies 
43A move by Volkswagen to begin manufacturing 
transportation vehicles in the U.S. (to avoid high labor 
costs and have a stronger market base in the U.S.) did 
little to help Schmidt's campaign with workers. It was 
seen as an exportation of jobs. 
44schmidt felt that West Germany was beginning to pull 
away from the rest of Western Europe due to its growing 
economic base and an unmatched aversion to communism. 
were seen only to be effective if they were coordinated 
with those in the U.S., and he traveled there to discuss 
economic issues, as well as issues pertaining to politics 
and the military. West Germans even celebrated the U.S. 
bicentennial as if it were their own bicentennial. U.S. 
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Vice President Nelson Rockefeller and Kissinger made trips 
to West Germany. An article covering Kissinger's 
statements on the role of the U.S. in Western Europe's 
defense was even carried by a special edition of a West 
German magazine. It was even discovered that the CIA and 
West German intelligence officials had been working closely 
together, though this did not make all West Germans happy. 
One issue that caused growing tensions among governmental 
officials was over developing a standardized military tank. 
Though the two countries did finally decide on some common 
components, 45 both accused the other of unfair competition. 
The U.S.S.R. and West Germany continued their on-
again-off-again relations. The former accused certain 
members of the latter of undermining relations, though 
Brezhnev did make a visit to West Germany. East German 
officials remained undecided over West Germany. Their new 
five year plan did not include any references to 
unification, but did envision normal relations. Relations 
with France continued to be apprehensive. Schmidt and 
d'Estaing met to discuss West Germany's industrial base, 
45The U.S. was to use West German guns, and West 
Germany was to use U.S. engines. 
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which d'Estaing felt was very strong. But, Schmidt further 
strained relations by saying he was worried about growing 
communist influences within France. d'Estaing, in possible 
retaliation, said that France must build its military to 
counter both the u.s.s.R. and West Germany. Finally, China 
stepped up its relations with West Germany by increasing 
trade to $725 million, and backing a unified Western Europe 
to balance the u.s.S.R. 46 
Military Activities 
Being the NATO border country meant that military 
activity would be a large part of the West German political 
and social landscape during the three years under study. 
Activity in this area was so pervasive that at times it 
seemed much more important than reunification or detente. 
West Germany stressed NATO and EC solidarity, and in 1974 
both Brandt and Schmidt were adamant about NATO forces in 
West Germany. West German officials at one point even 
traveled to the U.S. to discuss measures for reviving NATO 
forces and morale. Agreements were made between West 
Germany, the U.S., and Canada to pursue common components 
for military weapons in a move to standardize NATO forces. 
These three countries also had 41,000 troops participating 
in joint military activities in West Germany as a show of 
strength and solidarity. The only negative was that U.S. 
46There was other West German foreign relation action, 
though most of it consisted of a meeting (Great Britian) or 
a couple of statments (Angola). 
troops stationed in West Germany were criticized for being 
in the wrong place. West Germans felt that these troops 
had not adjusted to new Warsaw Pact capabilities that had 
changed invasion tactics and routes. 
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In 1975, West German military leaders became anxious 
after Warsaw naval activity in the Western Baltic Sea 
increased. Plus, they were concerned with the strength and 
stability of Turkey, and met with Turkish officials to 
discuss their worries. Portugal's seemingly turn towards 
communism also put West German leaders on edge, as did 
talks from the U.S. over reduction of nuclear missiles and 
a forty-six percent drop in exports (nation-wide) to the 
U.S. This latter issue was the start of talks over a 
possible economic recession in the U.S. and what that would 
mean to West Germany's capability to defend itself in case 
of an attack. This led Schmidt to confer with U.S. 
President Gerald Ford about NATO economic unity. West 
Germany made a $32.3 million weapons purchase from the u.s 
as well. Additionly, West German officials were worried 
about possible U.S. troop withdrawals, though this did not 
happen. As a matter of fact, the U.S. sent a brigade to 
the North German plain to take up a permanent position. 
Not all West Germans were happy with this, as 15,000 signed 
a protest petition. Contentions began to run high 
concerning NATO weapons standardization. West German 
officials accused U.S. officials of preventing open 
competition between military tank manufactures from the two 
countries. 
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West German officials got little relief in 1976. They 
were still weary of the Warsaw Pact countries, though they 
did feel that NATO could match this power. 47 West Germany 
continued to buy weapons from the U.S., spending $43 
million on U.S. military hardware. Though they were 
willing to pay this amount, they did balk at the prospect 
of buying $2.44 billion AWACs (Airborne Warning and Control 
system). Also, when the Warsaw Pact countries forwarded a 
proposal to mutually defer the first use of nuclear weapons 
and put a freeze on memberships into both pacts, West 
German officials opposed it. 
Labor -- Strikes and Unemployment 
Due to the strong ties between politics and labor 
within West Germany, it was difficult to separate the two 
areas (as can be seen by the discussion under the political 
subheading). At this point, I just want to reiterate a few 
key points. First, support for the codetermination bill 
was given by both workers and governmental leaders, but 
opposed by business leaders (both domestic and foreign). 
Plus, possibly to appease some of the business leaders, 
more managers were to take part in the boards created by 
the bill (this move was opposed by labor groups). 
Secondly, remember that unemployment was rising at this 
47This may have been based on the assumption that if 
war did break out between the two blocs, that there was 
enough firepower on each side that both would be 
eliminated. 
time -- something that West German workers had not 
experienced since the end of WWII. Finally, one of 
Schmidt's main re-election platforms was for safe, clean, 
humane working conditions. 
Quantitative Data 
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TABLES XIII, XIV, and XV contain the quantitative data 
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Hypotheses, Predictions, and Data for West German Managers 
I now move to my supporting hypotheses. 
• The first (national leaders) would predict workers 
expressing positive attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs. 
Though not all West German leaders pursued greater foreign 
relations, the overall policy of Ostpolitik of both 
Chancellors was pursued by most West German leaders. If 
workers saw these leaders as representing West Germany, 
then they would be behind this policy as well. 
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• The second supporting hypothesis (military 
intervention) is complicated in West Germany. Though no 
overt military action was taken by the West German 
military, there was definitely a foreign military presence 
at all times. Not only was a large (and growing) U.S. 
military contingent stationed in West Germany, there was 
also the fact that their closest neighbors to the east were 
Warsaw Pact countries. One would be hard pressed to say 
50source, Arbeits-Und Sozialstatistik (1978). 
51These numbers should be qualified. West German 
strike activity was actually low compared with other 
industrial nations. The numbers reflect not only actual 
strikes, but also worker grievances that did not end in 
actual strikes. 
that these factors would play no part in the attitudes of 
West Germans, so I would have to say that this would make 
West German workers anxious, and, therefore, espouse 
negative attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs. 
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• The third supporting hypothesis (worker unrest and 
strikes) would have workers expressing negative attitudes 
toward foreign-owned MNCs (the only year that had less than 
500 strikes was 1975). Remember, strike activity (as we 
know it in the U.S.) may not be accurately reflected in 
these numbers. 
• The fourth supporting hypothesis (GNP) would put 
workers in a positive mood toward foreign-owned MNCs, as 
GNP rose each of the five years. 
• The fifth hypothesis (GNP per capita) would predict 
positive attitudes as well, as GNP per capita kept pace 
with GNP. 
• The sixth supporting hypothesis (unemployment) 
would not predict positive attitudes, as the unemployment 
level each year was under six percent. This should be 
qualified, though, since the rates of unemployment were 
growing (at least in 1974 and 1975). Unemployment was also 
a major factor in elections during the years under study, 
so it could be said that though unemployment did not go 
over six percent, workers were worried about the prospects 
of unemployment -- foreign-owned MNCs may have been 
offering jobs. 
Combining the six supporting hypotheses gives a 
complex picture of possible attitudes. Though the overall 
foreign policy of West German leaders was one of openness, 
the military activity happening in and around West Germany 
could not have been ignored. And, though GNP and GNP per 
capita were rising, so was unemployment. Strike activity 
was high, but at the same time lower than other industrial 
countries. 
This complexity showed in Sauvant and Mennis' study. 
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Sauvant and Mennis did not study blue collar workers (as 
did Marton and Blake and Driscoll). Instead, they 
distributed questionnaires to 3,300 low-level managers and 
other white collar workers employed within foreign-owned 
MNCs operating in West Germany, West German-based MNCs, and 
businesses operating in West Germany only. They did not 
specf ically ask these workers if they were for or against 
foreign investments, but instead tried to discern whether 
the workers in the different types of companies were 
ethnocentric or internationally focused, and if there was a 
significant difference between the groups. Questions 
pertaining to such issues as affiliate orientation (who 
should control MNC affiliates), EC goals of integration 
(including possible personal financial sacrificies to 
achieve integration), and the attitudes toward foreign 
workers were posed to the respondents. None of the 
statistical findings were significant when workers from the 
different categories were compared to each other. 
These findings led Sauvant and Mennis to conclude that 
employment within MNCs had no effect on workers, though I 
think this may not be correct. It may be that they found 
no effect in West German workers, because of the national 
context within which these people lived. It may be that 
white collar workers are less inclined to be affected by 
whom they work for than are blue collar workers. It may 
even be a combination of these. This is based on the 
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survey reported in Chapter II, in which U.S. non-elites and 
elites differed on their attitudes toward foreign 
investment. I do not think that all the workers surveyed 
would be considered part of the West German elite, so this 
possibility is minimal. It is more likely that there was a 
national variable that was unaccounted for within the 
Sauvant and Mennis study. 
POSSIBLE DISCREPANCIES 
Before moving on to my conclusions, I think it is 
imperative that I discuss some possible shortfalls of this 
study. First of all, the choices of possible independent 
variables to study in this area are almost endless. The 
six chosen, as mentioned in Chapter IV, were ones that I 
felt would have an impact on the working class of a 
country. Other possible variables include export-import 
balances, value-added averages in MNCs, population growth, 
GNP of neighboring countries, type of government in the 
countries under study, wage differentials between MNCs and 
non-MNC firms. 52 The list goes on, and each variable could 
52oue to time restraints, I was not able to gather 
data on wages in the specific firms that were studied. It 
has been shown, though, that the average foreign-owned MNC 
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probably explain some of the variance within and between 
the studies, but a line has to be drawn at some point. 
Though I chose my line carefully, that is no guarantee that 
it was drawn in the right place. 
A second possible discrepancy is the fact that the 
same questionnaire was not used with each group of 
subjects. Though each questionnaire was tested for 
validity and reliability by those administering the 
questionnaires and interviews, this does not mean that they 
each measure the same attitudes in the same way. 
A third possible shortcoming is that the West German 
study was done across industrial sectors, while the 
Canadian and Brazilian studies were done in specific 
sectors (the former in a specific plant). It may be that 
if all sectors had been studied in each case there would be 
an 'averaging' influence. It was noted in Chapter III that 
not all workers are going to have the same attitudes toward 
work because of the nature of their work. It is possible 
that if the studies in Canada and Brazil had been coupled 
with questionnaires from the service sector (banking, real 
estate, etc.), then there would be greater differences (and 
so an 'averaging' of attitudes) between workers. This may 
wage is higher than home-based firms, though this may not 
be a significant difference (see Chapter II above, and 
Caves, 1982 [esp. pg. 151-153], though see Banaji and 
Hensman (1990) for an example of wage differences between 
home and foreign affiliates of the same companies [TABLE 
3.4, pg. 73]). 
be true in the case of Canada, 53 but hard to visualize in 
Brazil. The workers questioned were employed within 
paper/pulp mills, but still found pollution not be a 
problem. It seems that foreign investment was so welcomed 
in Brazil that workers within any sector would have viewed 
it positively. 
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Finally, though causal linkages were sought and the 
possibilities of such linkages discussed, the methodology 
used in this study does not give sufficient evidence to 
discern specific causal chains. The above data analysis is 
meant to give plausible agruments for the possibility of 
linakges between societal factors and workers' attitudes 
toward foreign-owned MNCs. Participant observations and 
quantitative tests (more interviews and questionnaires 
administered at neutral sites) are needed to supplement the 
findings found within the body of this text. I do not see 
this study as a finished piece, but as a gateway to a 
better understanding of societal influences on foreign-
owned MNC workers. 
53Though it should be noted that many in Canada were 
trying to keep foreign investment out of the service sector 
(see the discussion under Canadian Politics above). 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
MNCs are human institutions. They are started, 
managed, and carried on by humans. Like all human 
institutions, they are more than just the sum of their 
parts. For this reason, it is only the myopic 
researcher(s) who says that those working within such 
institutions will not be affected. Unless the workers are 
robots, 1 they will be affected in some way, whether this is 
an entrenching of nationalistic pride or an acceptance of a 
foreign presence. Which will happen will depend largely on 
the culture in which the workers live. These cultures are 
not static or ahistorical. As Peter M. Senge said, when we 
break our society into pieces " ••• we lose our intrinsic 
sense of connection to a larger whole," and cannot 
"reassemble the fragments •••• " (1990, pg. 3). To 
understand MNC workers and predict their attitudes toward 
their working environments, we must take into account 
societal aspects such as those investigated within this 
1It may be that they do not know their company is 
foreign-owned. This type of scenario is definitely worth 
studying -- why are they not aware of the nationality of 
their employer? Is it ignorance on part of the worker(s), 
or a hidden agenda on the part of the foreign owner(s)? 
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study. Workers are not just employed; they have families, 
life histories, educations, friends, coworkers, national 
leaders, financial situations, favorite radio and/or 
television programs. In other words, they live within 
communities -- within society. And like institutions, 
society is more than the sum of its parts. This should be 
made clear by the different findings of the researchers 
reported within this paper. There was one business 
practice investigated -- foreign-owned MNC -- in three 
different countries, with the result being that a majority 
of the workers in each group espoused an attitude towards 
MNCs that was different than the other groups. (A majority 
of the Canadian workers were opposed to foreign-owned MNCs, 
a majority of the Brazilian workers were in favor of 
foreign-owned MNCs, and a majority of the West German 
managers showed little or no preference between foreign-
owned MNCs, domestic-owned MNCs, and West German-only 
businesses.) 
This brings me to my main hypothesis, which stated 
that if a person is employed within a foreign-owned MNC, 
then he/she will have a positive attitude towards foreign-
owned MNCs. This is obviously false since a majority of 
the Canadian workers were opposed to foreign investment. 
What does this mean for the MNC effect, if it exists? 
First of all, I do think it exists. Very few people 
working within this environment can be unaffected -- work 
is too important to people's lives. Secondly, I think that 
the MNC effect is exacerbated by societal factors (and ~ 
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versa), one of the strongest being nationalism with 
national leaders' statements and military activities being 
strong candidates for possible predictors of overall 
nationalism within a country. Other societal factors, such 
as unemployment rates, strike activity, and overall 
economic strength of a country will also play a role in 
shaping the workers' attitudes. This explains the 
different attitudes of the workers in the different 
countries -- each population had experienced different 
societal circumstances. 
Let me now turn to sociological theory. I have 
already discussed the strengths and weaknesses of 
sociobiology and exchange theory (Chapter II), and rejected 
both in favor of social identity in which to approach and 
predict the attitudes of the MNC workers. Though I chose 
the social identity approach as the best theory in which to 
ground the predictions, other sociological theories are 
relevant and precursors to social identity. This approach 
has borrowed material from both functionalism and conflict 
theory. I will briefly discuss the contributions of these 
two theories to social identity and the study of MNC 
workers. 
As I noted in the second chapter, social identity 
theory is based on the idea that individuals seek out group 
labels that they feel would give them a positive self 
identification. This takes as given that society is 
structured in social categories, and that the labeling of 
the different groups serves the function of ordering a 
110 
potentially chaotic social world. By studying the workers 
within a social and cultural system, social identity is 
also seeing these latter systems as functioning to 
internalize values and beliefs within the workers. This is 
obviously borrowed from functionalism -- mainly Parsons' 
work on integration among systems of action. 
Functionalists would also point to the foreign-owned MNCs 
in Brazil as examples of functional economic integration; 
not only were the foreign-owned MNCs welcomed by the 
majority of the MNC workers, these firms brought jobs and 
economic strength to Brazil, and furthered global economic 
integration. Since economic integration is an essential 
element of society to most functionalists, this is a strong 
argument for using functionalism to predict the course of 
workers' overt reaction to foreign-owned MNCs. 
Functionalism, though, cannot easily predict which 
group label(s) is going to provide positive self 
identification, especially when more than one strong label 
(such as nationalism and working class) are in contention. 
Since many labels and, therefore, groups are in contention 
within society, 2 social identity borrows heavily from the 
conflict perspective, more so than from functionalism (Hogg 
and Abrams, 1988). It is important to keep in mind that, 
according to social identity theorists, social categories 
2Not all groups are opposed to each other, though the 
thread that holds them together is (usually) rather weak. 
Cooperation between groups is as important to the study of 
groups as is hostilities. 
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are not in harmony, but divided by deep differences in 
values and beliefs. The groups falling within the 
different categories will, in many cases, see the other 
groups as obstacles to obtaining positive identifications. 
For example, in the Canadian study a majority of the MNC 
workers had negative attitudes toward foreign-owned MNCs, a 
fundamentally opposed viewpoint to that of their employer. 
Even groups within Brazil were experiencing conflicts, such 
as that between the Catholic Church and the Brazilian 
government over the treatment of the indigenous population 
living within the rain forests. This can be generalized to 
other circumstances as well. A nationalistic worker in a 
foreign-owned weapons manufacturing company may be very 
unhappy with the foreign investment (or any type of company 
that is foreign-owned). Of course if jobs are scarce, or 
the worker is a strong international union advocate, the 
attitude towards foreign-owned MNCs may change. Would the 
opportunity of employment be enough to change the mind of 
the nationalistic worker, or, for the latter individual, 
will the foreign firm be seen as an opportunity to begin to 
network internationally with fellow workers? Social 
identity is a better predictor of actual attitudes (which 
will be explained further below), while conflict theory 
would predict the course the workers would take in dealing 
with the presence of foreign-owned MNCs. 
Conflict theory and functionalism are both macro 
theories, and so do not adequately explain microprocesses. 
Social identity theory is flexible enough to take into 
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Social identity theory is flexible enough to take into 
account both historical and immediacy effects, and looks 
for explanations of group label choices through the group 
within the individual making it more than a micro theory. 3 
This also alleviates the problem of tautology. Social 
psychological theories (and other microsociological 
theories) have been marked as tautological by some (~ 
Turner, 1987). These critics would ask whether the group 
label has been chosen because it is good, or whether the 
group label is good because it has been chosen. Using 
social identity theory, I would say it is most often the 
former, though there is a dialectic between the two forces. 
Let me return to the MNC workers. Workers are going to 
fall somewhere on the continuum of either welcoming or 
despising the foreign-owned MNC. Their placement on this 
continuum will be welcomed by others who share the same (or 
close to the same) attitudes, but unwelcomed by those who 
have opposing attitudes. In other words, a person's (or 
group's) attitudes will always be opposed by another person 
(or group). The stance (label) chosen was done because it 
was seen as offering a positive self identification. Group 
labels are most often chosen for their positive self 
3This is not to contradict the above statement that 
conflict theory could be a better predictor of an in-
groups' reaction to an out-group(s). What social identity 
theory could be used to predict beyond microprocesses is 
the possible out-groups targetted for hostilities (these 
would not have to be overt hostilities, but could be 
nothing more than verbal assaults within the in-group. 
identification, not that they are good because they are 
chosen. 4 This gives social identity theory -- when 
combined with sociohistorical factors a strong 
predictive ability that does not have to be relegated to 
individuals. 
To move beyond the microprocesses of social identity 
theory takes only the knowledge that humans are social 
animals. Groups that fail to attract new members (for 
whatever reason) 5 will become nonexistent (~ American 
Party), while others that gain new members6 may grow 
extremely large (~Christianity). This ability to 
explain both micro- and macroprocesses makes social 
identity theory a theoretical approach that needs to be 
intensively studied and tested, especially when used in 
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4This is not to say that some people choose labels 
because they want to be part of the in-group. Music and 
fashion fads ("pop" fads) are a good example of this. Many 
people will listen to a certain style of music or wear a 
certain style of clothes to feel like they are part of some 
group. What needs to be pointed out here is that the music 
and other fads are not the primary labels; the primary 
label is to be part of a certain group. 
5There could be many reasons for a group to fail to 
attract new members, such as being overly secretive or such 
an anomaly that very few people are interested in becoming 
a member. It may be that cases of the former could have 
given many people the possibility of positive self 
identification, but that the founding members were so 
protective of their group that they let no one else join. 
Small membership in such 9roups should not be seen as a 
rejection of social identification theory, but as an 
example of why freeze-frame studies need to be accepted 
with careful regard. 
6Gains can be made from recruitment or an "open-door" 
policy for new members. 
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combination with conflict theory. There are many 
institutions which can be investigated. The MNC is just 
one type of empirical institution which lends itself to the 
testing of social identity. More research needs to be done 
on attitudes before employment begins, and how these 
attitudes may change during employment. Also, studies need 
to be done on the steps taken to accommodate the MNCs or 
the negative attitudes toward the MNCs (is there a workers' 
backlash against the MNCs -- are strikes at MNCs more 
violent than strikes at other companies -- or are they 
finding positive identifications somewhere else?). In 
other groups, such as gangs, social identity could be 
tested by gathering information on why the members joined 
the gang (and why they continue to be a part or drop out). 
If "gang" status is unfulfilling to the members, yet they 
continue to be members, then social identity should be 
replaced by another theory, such as exchange theory if the 
members are only staying in to reap capital rewards. 7 
Finally, I would like to return to the MNC one last 
time. I started this paper with a statement about the 
world shrinking and expanding at the same time. To become 
a truly global community, we must stop the expansions. 
7This finding, though, would be problematic. If the 
capital rewards were the basis for positive self 
identification, then membership could be explained by 
social identity -- the capital rewards (and the symbols 
these bought) were more important to the positive self 
identity than the gang membership was to the negative self 
identity. 
115 
MNCs may be a key to furthering the understanding of 
different cultures, and, therefore, a key to a more 
peaceful global community. But, we must begin to 
investigate the processes of social distance and 
nationalism within the MNCs with more attention paid to 
spatial and temporal factors within society. Sociology and 
other social sciences must move beyond freeze-frame 
investigations, though this does not mean we have to go 
back to the origin of man for every study (which would be 
ludicrous). What needs to be done is to gain a more 
thorough understanding of the background of present human 
interaction and action. As it has been said, the best 
predictor of what happens today is what happened yesterday. 
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